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MELVIN W. REDER
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Tins paper reports an investigation of certain aspects of wage differ-
entials. The array of earnings of individuals from work may be arranged
in many ways: in this paper we consider oniy two arrangements, by
skill (or occupation) and by industry. In analyzing the behavior of
wage differentials, it is difficult to avoid drastic simplification in their
measurement; we frequently treat the number of workers at each level
of skill and in each industry as though it were a quantity, and either
their mean or their median wage as though it were a price.
The violence this does to a very complicated set of facts is obvious.
Though some of the appropriate warnings are given where needed,
others are not; therefore it may be helpful if, at the outset, a few pre-
cautionary remarks are made.
1. As usually measured, wages exclude the pecuniary value of fringe
benefits. This may well distort interindustry or interoccupational wage
comparisons for the postwar period. However, an appropriate set of
corrections is not at hand, and, willy-nilly, we have written as though
we believed fringe benefits were distributed more or less proportion-
ately to wages. This could affect some of our results; all we can do is
hope that the necessary amendments would not prove catastrophic.
2. When we speak of the wage level of an occupation or an industry,
we refer indifferently (unless otherwise specffied) to straight-time
average hourly earnings; average hourly earnings, including overtime
premiums; mean or median weekly or annual earnings. These various
concepts of earnings do not vary proportionally from one industry or
occupation to another, and we must take care not to make statements,
based on data referring to one concept of earnings, as though they
were necessarily applicable to data pertaining to other concepts.
3. We indicate whole frequency distributions of industrial or occu-
pational wage payments by a single measure of central tendency, a
mean or a median. This leaves completely unexplored the effect of
industry or occupation on other characteristics of earnings distributions.
NOTE: ThIS paper is part of a longer study on wage differentials, which has been
financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation to the Economics Department of
Stanford University.
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4. Finally, in treating the mean or median of an industry's or occu-
pation's earnings distribution as an indicator of the price of a particular
kind of labor, we abstract from all variations in hiring requirements—
labor "quality" as judged by the employer, and all variations in job
attractiveness as judged by the worker. However, these variations
reflect an important aspect of labor-market behavior.
Certainly we attempt to take these various factors into account at
places where they are especially pertinent. But there are places, particu-
larly in the section on industrial differentials, where paucity of data
and the usages of an existing literature lead us to speak of "average
wages" in an industry as though it were much more closely related
to the "price of a factor of production" than it actually is. Obviously,
in individual cases where the consequences of abstraction are known,
they are taken into account. However, there are many cases where
these consequences are not known and we proceed to apply economic
theory without, each time, mentioning all the necessary reservations.
For this one can only point to the need for reasonable brevity, and
explain in advance.
Occupational Wage Structure
Since J. S. Mill invented the concept of noncompeting groups, if not
before, economic theorists have tended to explain occupational differ-
ences in wages by differences in costs of training or other obstacles
to supply. But this explanation is, at most, supposed to account only
for long-run differences. In the short run, as usually defined, the
number of persons in one occupation is assumed to be virtually fixed,
and earnings are therefore presumed to be affected by recent changes
in labor demand and wage rigidities, as well as by supply influences. It
will therefore be convenient to separate the long- and short-run aspects
of the matter and discuss them separately, though giving their inter-
relation due attention.
In discussing occupational or skill differentials, we adopt a particu-
lar, though customary, definition of the wage recipients whom we
designate as skilled and unskilled. Here, the skilled workers are usually
some sort of manual craftsmen, e.g., carpenters, millwrights, electri-
cians, etc., while the unskilled are laborers, sweepers, watchmen, and
the like. The records of the wages paid in the specific occupations
chosen suffer from the usual limitations of samples and, in addition,
the occupations used to represent skilled and unskilled workers are
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themselves samples of skilled and unskilled occupations generally.
The existence and relative increase of intermediate grades of skill
create problems of demarcating skilled from unskilled occupations.
One study, Keat's, measures skiil differentials by the coefficient of
variation of the ratio of the wage rates in 141 specific occupations to
the average hourly earnings in all manufacturing; this largely over-
comes the aforementioned difficulties except for those resulting from
the limitations of manufacturing as a sample of the whole economy.
We measure the skill differential as the percentage difference be-
tween the hourly earnings of workers designated as skilled and those
designated as unskilled. This is not the only possible measure that
could be used; an alternative would be to measure the absolute dif-
ferential—the dollar amount of the differential. We have chosen to
measure the differential in percentage terms because we are primarily
interested in the skill differential as one indicator of the relative eco-
nomic well-being of two groups of earners. Though neither the absolute,
the percentage, nor any one-dimensional measure of the earnings
differential will be completely satisfactory for the purpose, we believe
that changes in the percentage differential far more closely approxi-
mate that by which economists and others judge relative economic
well-being than changes in the absolute differential do.
En an unpublished study, Gary S. Becker (properly) argues that
the percentage differential is not always relevant in analyzing resource
allocation. He contends that it is appropriate when we are attempting
to explain variations in relative demand for skilled and unskilled
workers. But if we should be interested in explaining variations in the
resources devoted to investment in "human capital"—to education and
training—as compared with those devoted to other uses, then it is
the absolute difference that is relevant. This is because the percentage
return on a given dollar investment in human capital is identffied with
the skill differential.
This view implies that if the dollar (i.e., absolute) skill differential
between occupations A and B declined from t0 to t1, but in proportion
with a decline in the difference in training costs, the skill differential
(as measured) would be unchanged. However, we would still be inter-
ested, from a "welfare-distribution" point of view, in the differential
earnings of the persons engaged in these occupations as well as in the
return on the differential (dollar) investments they embody. Since we
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have, inter alia, this welfare-distributive interest, we concentrate upon
the behavior of percentage differentials.
Now let us turn to a consideration of the long-run characteristics
of the wage structure.
SECULAR BEHAVIOR OF THE OCCUPATIONAL WAGE STRUCrUBE
Most writers, including the present one, have contended that occupa-
tional relative (i.e., percentage) wage differentials, on an hourly basis
(hereafter called the "skill margin"), have shown a secular tendency
to diminish.' One important reason for this belief is empirical; the
available evidence has seemed to support this view.2 But, as we shall
see, the facts do not tell a completely unambiguous story. If they did,
we should expect to find that close substitutes of unskilled urbane
workers would also have experienced a relative increase in hourly
earnings—and some have not done so. For example, we should expect
that the hourly wages of farm workers, who are closer substitutes for
urban unskilled and semiskilled than for urban skilled workers, would
'M. W. Reder, "The Theoiy of Occupational Wage Differentials," American
Economic Review, Dec. 1955, pp. 833-852, especially n. 1, contains a fairly ex-
tensive bibliography of the literature before that date. The more important con-
tributions since then are L. G. Reynolds and C. H. Taft, The Evolution of Wage
Structure, New Haven, 1956; Economic Survey of Europe in 1955, United Nations,
1956, pp. 153-157; M. Rothbaum, "National Wage-structure Comparisons," New
Concepts in Wage Determination, C. W. Taylor and F. C. Pierson, eds., New York,
1957, pp. 299-327; The Theory of Wage Determination, J. T. Dunlop, ed., London,
1957, especially the papers of Clark Kerr and Lloyd Reynolds; R. Penman, "Forces
Widening Occupational Wage Differentials," Review of Economics and Statistics,
May 1958, pp. 107-115; M. Yanowitch, "Trends in Soviet Occupational Wage
Differentials," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Jan. 1960, pp. 166-191;
William Goidner, "Labor Market Factors and Skill Differentials in Wage Rates,"
Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1957, pp. 207-218;
and an unpublished doctoral dissertation by P. C. Keat, "Changes in Occupational
Wage Structure, 1900-1956," at the University of Chicago, 1959. An article by
Keat, "Long-run Changes in Occupational Wage Structure, 1900-1956," Journal
of Political Economy, Dec. 1960, pp. 584-600, is based on his thesis.
2 The best data summaries are in Reynolds and Taft, The Evolution, pp. 32-38;
59-63; 92-98; 108-128; 213-218; 240-242; 269-275; 293-298; and 319-327; and
in Keat, "Changes in Occupational." Perlman, "Forces Widening." also contains
some useful discussion of the data.
S The data on skill differentials refer almost exclusively to urban workers.
Since one critic has challenged this assertion, we submit the following data
from the 1950 Census: Among employed persons (both sexes) who resided in
urban or rural nonfarm locations in March 1950 and were employed in nonfarm
occupations, but had resided on farms in 1949, 55.8 per cent were occupationally
classified as operatives and kindred workers; laborers except farm and mine or
service workers—these are what are usually considered unskilled or semiskilled jobs.
Classified as craftsmen, foremen, etc.—Le., as skilled manual workers—were 13.8
per cent. For all other employed persons, the corresponding percentages were 40.3
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rise relative to skilled earnings, but it is not clear 'that they have done
so. The data in Table 1 clearly imply that in 1956 the ratio of their
earnings to average hourly earnings in manufacturing was well below
what it was in 1929, which was less than it had been in 1914. How-
TABLE 1
AVERAGE GROSS HOURLY EARNINGS IN MANUFACTURING, LAUNDRIES,
AND AGRICULTURE, SELECTED DATES, 1929-58
All
ManufacturingIndexLaundriesIndexAgricultureIndex
1929 $0.566 100 n.a. $0.241 100
1934 0.532 94 $0.378 100 0.152 63
1939 0.633 112 0.422 112 0.166 69
1940 0.661 117 0.429 113 0J69 70
1941 0.729 129 0.444 117 0.206 86
1945 1.023 181 0.648 172 0.472 196
1948 1.350 239 0.817 216 0.588 241
1955 1.88 332 1.01 267 0.675 280
1956 1.98 350 1.05 268 0.705 292
1957 2.07 366 1.09 277 0.728 302
1958 2.13 376 1.13 299 0.757 314
1959 2.22 392 1.17 310 0.798 331
1960 2.29 405 1.22 323 0.8 18 339
SOURCE: Department of Labor and Department of Agriculture.
ever, these data are not beyond challenge: H. G. Lewis has shown
me some unpublished computations of average hourly compensation
in agriculture and manufacturing which show that with the ratio,
average hourly earnings in agriculture
put equal to 100 m 1929,
average hourly earnings in manufacturing
its value stood at 118 in 1956; i.e., contrary to the implication of Table 1,
agricultural hourly compensation rose relatively to manufacturing.
Fortunately, for the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to choose
between the two sets of estimates or even attempt to reconcile them.
per cent in the various unskilled and semiskilled categories, and 15.7 per cent in
the craftsmen, etc., group (data from 1950 Population Census, Special Report P-E,
No. 4C, Population Mobility—Farm-Nonf arm Movers, Table 3, p. 4C-14). In other
words, recent rural-urban migrants were more prone to be employed as unskilled or
semiskilled manual workers, and less likely to be employed as skilled—at least in
1950—than the remainder of the labor force.
The main source of difference between Lewis's data and those cited in Table 1
isin the figures on agricultural earnings. The series in Table 1 is derived directly
from the Department of Agriculture surveys, while Lewis's compensation data
come from the Department of Commerce and from some unpublished hours-per-
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But despite their differences, both series reveal a marked decline
(about 20 per cent) in the above ratio during the 1950's, when the
skill margin was about constant. This implies either that rural and urban
labor markets are somewhat insulated from one another or that their
interrelation is subject to a prolonged lag. In either event, there arises
the possibility that the observed behavior of skill differentials in part
of the economy may be a misleading guide to what has happened in
other parts.
Laundry workers, like farm workers, are far better substitutes for
unskilled than for skilled workers. And, in the absence of a competing
series, we shall assert that their hourly earnings have declined relative
to those in manufacturing from 1929 to 1957. Hence, if the trend
toward reduced skill differentials is genuine, it is necessary to explain
the growing gap between hourly earnings in manufacturing and in
laundries, as well as the questionable relation between agricultural
and manufacturing earnings.
One explanation of the growing wage disadvantage of the laundry
workers is that, in terms of employment, laundering is a declining
industry. From 1947 through 1958, employment in this industry fell
14 per cent (from 365,000 to 313,000). Thus it might be possible to
rationalize the behavior of laundry wages as that of a declining in-
dustry in which some older workers are trapped but from which the
more mobile are escaping; such an explanation is an entirely conven-
tional application of short-run equilibrium analysis. No doubt there
is validity in this explanation, but it is hard to believe that it is the
whole story. For, in the postwar period, employment opportunities
have usually been adequate to permit the escape of most workers into
low-skilled jobs in manufacturing. A further explanatory factor that
we believe should be taken into account is the probable relaxation of
year data supplied by John Kendrick. The disagreement between the two sets of
data lies mainly in their trends in hourly agricultural compensation: in Lewis's
series the average rate of increase between 1929 and 1956 is about lii times as
great as in that of Table 1. However, both series show (1) an appreciable (over
30 per cent) decline in the ratio of average hourly compensation in agriculture
to that in industry during the early 1930's; (2) a very sharp rise in this same
ratio during World War II; and (3) a sharp fall in this ratio from 1950-51 through
(at least) 1957.
In fairness to Lewis, it should be noted that he does not claim his series to be
superior to that in Table 1; he merely believes that, on available information, there
is not an adequate base for choosing.
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hiring standards to accept increasingly less eligible workers,6 and some
related phenomena to be discussed.
The declining industry hypothesis—i.e., relative declines in hourly
earnings in an industry result from an uncompleted adjustment to a
reduction in employment—could also be applied to explain the be-
havior of agricultural earnings, if such earnings have shown a relative
decline. But, once again, the opportunities for interindustry mobility
have raised a question as to whether there has been a differential
change in hiring standards as between agriculture and the rest of the
economy.
It might seem that the declining industry hypothesis, with a slight
modification, could account for the relative wage behavior in both
agriculture and laundries. That is, the conventional short-run analysis
of a declining industry's relative wages implies that they will fall be-
cause some workers cannot or will not shift industries, though when
they retire they will not be replaced. As the immobile workers dispro-
portionately represent the older segment of the industry's labor force,
it is to be expected that in the short run there will be a decline in the
quality of the labor force as well as in employment; this will appear
as a change in hiring standards.
The main factors which this analysis leaves out of account are such
"institutional" ones as the differential effect of minimum wage laws,
trade union pressure, curbs on child labor, etc. Clearly, minimum wage
laws affect far larger segments of manufacturing than of either launder-
ing or agriculture. Consequently, the relative decline of hourly earn-
ings in the latter two industries may simply indicate the fact that
market forces were free to set low wages in many of these industries'
local markets but were prevented from doing so in manufacturing.
In other words, the usual measures of skill margins refer to differ-
ences in hourly earnings of different occupational groups in a large
section of the economy, but do not reflect events in another part which
is of some importance. The available statistics refer to urban areas and
are collected disproportionately from large firms which are fairly
long-lived; conversely, they underrepresent firms with the opposite
characteristics. This creates the possibility that divergent movements
6Itis difficult to test this surmise on census data since the Census Bureau does
not publish detailed characteristics of laundry workers separately, but combines
them with those of persons employed in cleaning and dyeing establishments. How-
ever, the matter can surely be investigated further.
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in the "premium for skill" in these two parts of the economy may
render data from either sector a misleading guide to skill margins in
the economy as a whole.
Did this possibility materialize in the United States and elsewhere
during the past twenty-five to fifty years? In our judgment, the answer
is probably not. The compression of differentials in annual earnings
since 1929, noted by Kuznets, Goldsmith, and others, would imply
that this distribution behaved as though there had been a contraction
in the margin for skill. Moreover, from 1939 to 1949 (at least), the
dispersion of the medians of annual earnings of (full-year) wage and
salary workers in different occupations declined during that period;
this would suggest the same conclusion, though for a shorter period.
There is further evidence, though of a different kind, which also sug-
gests that there was secular shrinkage in the skill margin. It will not
be seriously disputed that persons engaged in what are normally called
skilled occupations generally have a higher level of education (more
years of schooling) than those in unskilled trades. It will also be agreed
that, whatever the causal pattern, variations in years of school attend-
ance are associated with variations in occupational levels. Clearly, in
the past fifty years, if not longer, there has been a marked cumulative
increase in the median number of years of school completed by mem-
bers of the American labor force. This would, ceteris paribus, have
the effect of increasing the fraction of the labor force able to hold
skilled jobs. Since the fraction of the labor force in skilled employment
has increased secularly,8 it is tempting to relate this fact and the decline
in the skill margin by a conventional application of price theory.
This argument is as follows: there has been a secular increase in the
relative supply of skilled as compared with unskilled workers which
has led—because of a failure of relative demand for skilled workers
to increase as much (at relevant ratios of skilled to unskilled wage
rates )—to a decline in the skill differentials. The relative increase in
the number of skilled workers is thus consistent with the above theory
and with a decline in the skill margin; therefore it would seem to pro-
H. P. Miller, income of the American People, New York, Wiley, 1955, Chap. 9,
especially pp. 120-21 and Table 67.
8 From 1900 to 1950, craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers (roughly, skilled
manual workers) increased from 10.5 per cent to 14.2 per cent of the labor force.
Operatives, etc.(the semiskilled) increased even more (in percentage terms)
during that period, but laborers, both farm and nonfarm (the urban unskilled
and their substitutes) decreased sharply (see D. J. Bogue, The Population of the
United States, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, Table 17-1, p. 475).
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vide an additional reason for believing that the skill margin really has
declined secularly.
But this argument is not free from difficulty: it is possible that the
secular increase in the relative number of skilled workers is due mainly
to changes in relative demand rather than supply. We do not have any
independent measure of changes in relative demands for skilled and
unskilled workers, and we cannot deny that the spreading of educa-
tion may have been partly a response to relative changes in labor
demand. If this possibility is accepted as an "important" cause of the
relative increase in the number of skilled workers, we cannot buttress
the finding of a declining skill margin by the behavior of the relative
numbers of skilled and unskilled workers.
However, we are inclined to deny that there have been important
changes in relative demand for the following reasons: (1) below the
college level—and it is with this range that we are concerned—in-
creased schooling has been due in good part to laws compelling school
attendance; (2) a substantial role in the relative decline of unskilled
labor has been the sharp reduction in child labor (under legal pres-
sure) and, in the United States, the reduction in immigration. Both of
these developments tended to reduce the relative supply of the un-
skilled at the same time that they raised the median years of schooling
of the labor force. (3) Of the increase in private expenditure for
education that has occurred, the major explanatory factor has been the
increased income (of parents); i.e., private educational expenditure
below the college level has been viewed as a consumer luxury good
rather than as a producer good. (4) Those ambitious persons who
respond to the lure of higher incomes by increasing their training—at
least in the United States—have not gone into skilled manual work
but into business or the professions. Consequently, their effect on the
supply of skilled labor would have been small.
While we believe that these assertions can be supported with em-
pirical evidence (1 and 2 easily, 3 with a little effort, and 4 with con-
siderable effort), for the present consider them merely as assertions.
If all were true, they could not prove that changes in relative demand
This possibility is indicated very clearly in G. S. Becker's unpublished manu-
script, "Investment in Human Capital." For the purpose of our paper, delayed
(supply) response to an initial skill differential in excess of the (long-run) equi-
librium level would yield the same price-quantity behavior as a shift in the supply
function with instantaneous adjustments; i.e., the relative quantity of the skilled will
increase and their differential wage advantage will shrink. Hence, we shall not
bother to distinguish this from a downward shift in the long-run supply function.
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had no part, or even a smaller part than changes in relative supply,
in narrowing the margin for skill. All they are intended to do is indicate
the evidence that could be marshalled in support of the claim that
supply factors are adequate to explain the secular decline in the skill
differential. But it cannot be denied that an adequate alternative
explanation stressing demand factors might yet be offered.
The explanation of a secular decline in the skill margin offered here
would strongly suggest that the decline will continue. However, not
everyone agrees: one recent writer10 has argued that because of the
possibility of relaxing hiring standards, it is likely that in the future
skill differentials will be widening rather than narrowing. That is,
employers will relax hiring standards for the unskilled more than for
the skilled, thereby causing a widening of the skill margin. Moreover,
as he contends, it is possible that technical progress will have the
DEMAND FOR SKILLED WORKERS
effect of increasing the ratio, ,morethan
DEMAND FOB UNSKILLED WORKERS
SUPPLY OF broadened educational opportunities will increase the ratio
SUPPLY OF
SKILLED WORKERS . . .
ata given set of relative waes.1' This nossibilit
UNSKILLED WORKERS
could manifest itself by drawing an increasing fraction of full-time
adult male earners toward skilled trades, with their places being taken
(in part) by "the transient, the very young, the very old, and the
physically, mentally and socially handicapped."
However, this labor reserve" has always been available and, more-
over, was in the past bolstered by elements no longer available, e.g.,
children and immigrants. Penman offers no reason to suppose that the
net result of these various factors should be a different secular trend
in the skill margin than has existed hitherto. Nevertheless, it is possible
that technical progress in transportation (e.g., the automobile) and in
household appliances has shifted downward the supply schedule of
the typical housewife's labor services.12 In considering this possibility,
it is necessary to recognize that many housewives, wishing employ-
10 R. Perlinan, "Forces Widening Occupational Wage Differentials," Review of
Economics and Statistics, May 1958, pp. 107-115.
11 This statement, and the one following, is my interpretation of Penman's
argument on p. 113.
12 The secular rise in the fraction of the female population in the labor force is,
of course, no evidence for or against this possibility; at least part of this rise has
been simply a movement along a given supply function in response to increased
demand; on this point the reader should see the paper of Jacob Mincer in this
volume.
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ment at going wage rates, have often been frustrated by employer
hiring requirements or legal restraints on hiring, or both.13 Relaxation
of either of these restraints clearly may lower unskilled wage rates
relative to others.'4
Another possibility is that with rising family incomes it is possible
that secondary earners will tend to substitute lower-paying, but
pleasariter, jobs for jobs with the reverse characteristics. This would,
ceteris paribus, reduce the wage rates on what have traditionally been
considered pleasant jobs, and raise them on jobs traditionally con-
sidered unpleasant. If we assume unskilled manual labor to be "un-
pleasant," and white-collar jobs to be "pleasant," this would imply a
decline in the relative earnings of white-collar to manual jobs. It seems
likely that something of this sort has happened over the last half-
century.'5
In short, it is possible that the concomitants of economic progress
will, as Douglas once surmised, transform the occupational wage struc-
tare so that the jobs at the bottom will be comparatively pleasant and
their low remuneration a "compensating" differential. Whether this
comes to pass will depend more upon employer hiring standards con-
cerning part-time workers, especially married women, etc., and upon
legal and customary restraints upon hourly wages, than upon the
relative costs of educating such workers.
In other words, the secular behavior of skill differentials reflects
not only variations in relative costs of "producing" skilled and unskilled
workers, but also the restraints upon the labor market imposed by
legal action (e.g., minimum wage laws, restrictions on child labor, etc.)
and the variations in relative labor supply of skilled and unskilled labor
services consequent upon rising real incomes. The operation of these
latter factors could alter the trend in skill differentials and make it
widen in the future; however, in our judgment there is no reason for
thinking that these forces will be more powerful in the future than
they have been heretofore.
So far in our discussion we have deliberately ignored the alleged
influence of inflation on the skill differential. One writer (Penman)
13 For example, minimum wage laws, laws against industrial homework, etc.
14have discussed this point elsewhere: "Theory of Occupational Wage Differ-
entials," pp. 838-840.
' Cf. K. M. McCaffree, "The Earnings Differential Between White Collar and
Manual Occupations," Review of Economics andStatistics,Feb. 1953, pp. 20-30,
especially pp. 20-21; also P. H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 1890-
1926, Boston, Houghton Muffin, 1930, pp. 367-368.
267WAGE DIFFERENTIALS:
contends that "our inflation-conscious public, government, and mone-
tary authorities willexertevery effort to stabilize prices, thus remov-
ing the strongest force in narrowing the differential_inflation."b6 Let
us put aside the prognostication about the future of the price level
and concentrate on the analytical issue—the relation of wage structure
and inflation. Penman's contention is that unskilled workers "need"
larger percentage increases in hourly wages than skilled and, therefore,
exert "more urgent upward pressure on wages."7
This argument is not peculiar to any one author,' but despite its
currency, we find it simply implausible. Our objection to the argument
does not refer to its use as an ad hoc explanation of events in a specific
(short-run) situation; in such applications, one must judge it as best
one can, case by case. The following remarks are directed solely to
its use as an explanation of a secular trend in wage differentials.
As we have argued elsewhere, there is, in nearly every community,
a minimum real hourly wage below which the hiring of labor services
is not permitted.19 The minimum is closely related to unskilled wage
rates (but not to skilled rates) and variations in it may therefore have
a marked—and possibly permanent—effect on skill differentials. The
argument we are considering goes further: it alleges (in effect) that
this minimum is subject to a money illusion; i.e., the relative value of
the minimum rises with the price level in such a way that the greater
the secular rise of the latter, the greater the secular decline in the skill
margin. Testing this contention would not be difficult if we were free
to assume that both the skilled and the unskilled labor markets were in
equilibrium. However, the existence of a minimum real wage has fre-
quently caused unemployment of the unskilled; this is one of the
strongest arguments to support the hypothesis of a minimum real wage.
This makes the hypothesis of labor market equilibrium doubtful, which,
in turn, puts the above-mentioned money-illusion thesis beyond reach
of simple tests.2° For the present, one is free to accept it if he chooses;
but there is no reason for doing so.
16 Perlman, "Forces Widening," p. 115.
17 This is a dubious contention for periods of full employment which frequently
coexist with inflation. For with full employment, families whose principal earner
has deficient wages can remedy the deficit by supplying secondary earners. That is,
since unemployment hits the unskilled more than the skilled, full employment bene-
fits them proportionately more.
18 For example, it is also expressed by Knowles and Robertson, "Differences be-
tween the Wages of Skilled and Unskilled Workers, 1880-1950," Bulletin of the
Oxford Institute of Statistics, Apr. 1951, pp. 109-127.
19 Reder, "Theory of Occupational," pp. 839-840.
20 What is needed, as a minimum, are data measuring excess demand or unem-
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THE PATTERN OF SHORT-RUN FLUCrUATIONS IN SKiLL MARGINS
Itis generally agreed that in the short run skill margins change rela-
tively little during "normal" periods, but contract sharply during
periods of over-full employment. It is also possible that they widen
during major depressions, though this is not c1ear. We have attempted
elsewhere to account for the sharp reduction in skill margins during
the two World Wars when there was excess demand for all types of
labor.22 What is not accounted for is why the sharp narrowing of
occupational wage rates that has occurred during war periods has been
only partially reversed subsequently.
If we grant that there is a secular decline in the skill margin, and
that little or no decline occurs in "normal" periods, it is a matter of
arithmetic that wartime declines must exceed postwar increases. The
analytical question is why a trend that presumably reflects more or
less steady changes in supply should manifest itself in short violent
movements followed by long periods of comparative quiescence. There
may be many possible explanations of this phenomenon; let us con-
sider two.
The first of these is as follows: the relative supply of skilled and
unskilled workers is only indirectly affected by the educational attain-
ment of the labor force. Having more schooling does not automatically
fit a man for a more skilled job; it merely increases his ability to absorb
the specific training that qualifies him for such a job. To obtain this
training itis necessary to serve an apprenticeship, attend a trade
school, or get it on the job. In some cases (e.g., where training must
come through a union-influenced apprentice program), availability of
training may be limited by the current employment situation. In
others, workers seem uninterested in taking advantage of training
programs unless they are connected with the imminent prospect of pro-
motion or unless they involve on-the-job training. This lack of interest
largely reflects the apparent reluctance (or inability) of employers
ployrnent for skilled and unskilled workers, separately, under conditions of secular
inflation; i.e., we need long-time series or at least a few observations well separated
in time.
21 Keat ("Changes in Occupational," Chapter II) finds evidence of this in both
the 1920-21 and 1929-32 depressions. P. W. Bell ("Cyclical Variations and Trends
in Occupational Wage Differentials in American Industry since 1914," Review of
Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1951, pp. 329-337), however, found a widening
of the differential only in the 1920-21 contraction. Knowles and Robertson ("Differ-
ences Between the Wages," especially p. 111) found that skill differentials did not
widen in Great Britain during 1929-32, though they did in the early 1920's.
22 Reder, "Theory of Occupational,"pp. 840-845.
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to accept inexperienced or partially skilled workers merely in order
to reduce the wage premium on skilled jobs. According to this piece
of speculation, in "normal" times, supply and demand for skilled
workers is kept more or less in balance at current skill margins by the
various obstacles (and discouragements) to acquiring requisite skill.
To elaborate a bit: Much of the difference between a highly com-
petent skilled worker and one less competent lies in the greater range
of tasks that the more competent worker can perform. Assuming,
realistically, that labor turnover involves expense,23 the differential
advantage of the more competent skilled worker to his employer will
become greater the more varied are the tasks that the firm's output
pattern imposes on him. Conversely, long runs of one particular product
minimize variation in a skilled worker's productive role, and hence in
his differential advantage.
During a war period, huge orders create the possibility of producing
long runs of one particular product. This makes it possible to keep
partially trained workers continuously occupied at a narrow range of
tasks; consequently, it may—though it need not—absolutely reduce
the demand for the broadly trained. Put differently, the elasticity of
substitution between partially (narrowly) and fully (broadly) skilled
workers is increased. Furthermore, in wartime the premium on speed
of delivery makes it more profitable than normally to hire workers
whose limited skills compel them to be idle—"unproductive"—for part
of the time spent on the job. The relatively short and simple training
needed to learn one or a few specific skills further encourages training
and use of partially skilled workers.2'
In short, in a war period, there is a relative shift in labor demand
from more to less broadly skilled workers, with the less broadly
skilled tending to acquire the titles but only part of the functions of
those more fully trained. The effect is (1) to increase the supply of
workers able to fill jobs with skilled titles and (2) to curb the increase
in demand for workers with specific high-level skills. While (1) acts
as a brake upon wage increases to those holding jobs with skilled
titles,25 (2) curbs wage increases to those who have broad skills.
23 The importance of this point is brought home by an unpublished doctoral
dissertation of W. Y. Oi of the University of Chicago. 2 statementimplies that firms become short-run monopsonists with regard
to fully trained workers, but not with regard to the partially trained (see fuller
discussion below).
25 Which is what the data reflect.
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After the war, labor demand reverts, more or less, to its prewar com-
position in response to the relative decline in large orders which re-
quire long runs and permit the use of limited skill workers. However,
the partial training acquired during the war reduces the prime cost of
becoming fully trained, as compared with starting from scratch.
Furthermore, many of the workers promoted during the war display
such industry and aptitude that they are offered continued employment
on skilled jobs if only they acquire the full range of skills needed for
peacetime employment; sometimes employers will even defray the
training costs involved. The effect of a job promise, combined with
successful experience, is greatly to reduce the uncertainty of getting
employment which is a real, though nonpecuniary, cost of training.
Thus, the relative supply of skilled workers is increased, which tends
to prevent a return to the prewar skill margin.
A second explanation is suggested by the behavior of "experience
differentials." By experience differentials I refer to the wage differ-
entials that are associated with length of service in a given firm or
organization. There is a very extensive overlap of skill and experience;
in many cases skill, and the reward thereof, is simply a by-product
of long experience in a particular line of work, and is acquired more
or less by osmosis. Often, when an employer specifies that he wants an
"experienced" worker, what he means is that he wants a relatively
skilled one, and considers successful experience as an indication of
skill. Consequently, it is not surprising that skill and experience should
be confused, both in practical and theoretical discourse.
For reasons that will become apparent, we believe that the wages of
unskilled or inexperienced workers or both are apt to be more sensitive
to the state of the labor market than those of workers with the reverse
characteristics. In support of this proposition, let us consider a rather
rare type of data: the behavior of earnings data classified by years of
experience of the earner. Such data are quite rare: one of the few good
sources is the data for engineers presented by Blank and Stigler.26
These data are the monthly salaries of engineers, classified by years of
26D.M. Blank and C. J. Stigler, The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel,
New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957; see Appendix Tables
A-S (p. 117), A-9 (pp. 138-134), A-14 and A-15 (pp. 140-141).
Since this section was written, an excellent study by Robert Evans, Jr. ("Worker
Quality and Wage Dispersion: An Analysis of a Clerical Labor Market in Boston,"
Proc. Industrial Relations Research Association, Dec. 1961, pp. 246-259) has
appeared. In his paper, Evans presents strong evidence of experience differentials
among Boston stenographers (see pp. 250-251).
271WAGE DIFFERENTIALS:
experience, for selected years in the period from 1894 to 1953; they
reveal a pronounced upward trend in the ratio (1) of the salaries of
starting engineers27 to those of experienced engineers and (2) of the
salaries of less experienced engineers to those of more experienced.
What is more to our present purpose, these ratios rose especially
rapidly in periods when the over-all demand for engineers rose with
unusual speed but then subsequently declined, contrary to trend, when
the demand for engineers declined. For example: during World Wars
I and II and during the Korean episode (periods of sharp increase in
demand) the salaries of inexperienced engineers rose markedly rela-
live to those of engineers with more experience.28 And, in each case,
27 That is, those with less than one year of experience. Years of experience refers
to years elapsed since start of first professional job, though in some cases this is
estimated (imperfectly) by the difference between an engineer's age and the
median age at which graduate engineers receive their first degree. Thus defined,
experience is not length of experience with one firm as the argument requires;
however, it is likely to be strongly correlated with it.
28 As Blank and Stigler summarize the data for the World War I period, "the
increase in earnings at the starting level and at one and two years experience
ranged between 61 and 80 per cent between 1914-1916 and 1919-1921, while
the increase for engineering graduates with 10, 15 and 20 years experience ranged
between zero and 20 per cent" (The Demand and Supply, pp. 124-125, and
Table A-5).
For the World War II period, the data in Table A-8 (p. 130 of Blank and
Stigler) show that the median salary for engineers with less than 1 year of experi-
ence rose by 80 per cent between 1939 and 1946, but rose by only 58 per cent
(during the same period) for those with 9-11 years of experience and by only
27 per cent for those with 30-34 years experience. (Tables A-b and A-li, pp. 135-
186, show that a similar relation existed within each field of engineering.)
During the Korean War, average monthly salaries for engineers of varying
levels of experience behaved as indicated in the following table, which shows the
annual percentage changes in average monthly salaries of research engineers and
scientists with B.S. degrees, by years of experience, 1948-55. The relevant pairs
of years are 1951-52 and 1952-53.
Percentage Changes, by Years of
Experience
0 1 9 10 11
1948-49 —3.2 —0.3 2.8 1.1 0.9
1949-50 1.8 1.7 2.0 3.5 3.2
1950-51 6.9 5.0 7.6 6.7 6.9
1951-52 11.3 12.7 8.2 9.4 8.1
1952-53 6.8 6.7 3.8 4.0 4,4
1953-54 8.7 5.5 1.6 2.1 3.4
1954-55 7.2 5.0 16.6 8.9 8.0
Sounca: National Survey of Professional Scientific Salaries, Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory of the University of California, 1949 through 1955. Each set of
percentages derived from data collected in a single survey, to avoid the effects of
changes in coverage. Taken from Blank and Stigler, Table A-15, p. 141.
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soon after the demand for engineering service slackened, the salaries
of inexperienced engineers underwent a relative decline.29 Further-
more, during the depressed 1930's (1929-39), the salaries of inexperi-
enced engineers declined relative to those with more experience.'0
It is possible that this argument rests upon a statistical mirage. That
is, the tendency for the experience differential among engineers to
diminish in periods of sharp increase in demand might be due mainly
to the fact that in such periods demand is concentrated on certain
newly developed specialties (e.g., in the early 1950's, the strong demand
was for electronic engineers, aeronautical engineers, and so forth) in
which there is literally no stock of experienced practitioners. If so, the
relative increase in wages of the inexperienced has occurred only
because the pressure of increased demand has been greatest in those
specialties where the number of experienced engineers was extremely
small relative to demand. If this were the whole story, we would expect
that there would be no tendency for the experience differential, within
given categories of engineers (especially those little affected by tern-
29 In the post-World War I period, from 1919 to 1924, the median monthly
starting salary for engineers rose by 14 per cent, while that of engineers with 9-11
years experience rose by one-third (Table A-6, Blank and Stigler, The Demand and
Supply, p. 126).
Data for the post-World War II period are given in the table in footnote 28.
These data show that in each of the pairs of years between 1948 and 1951 (with the
exception of new graduates as compared with those of 10 and 11 years experience
in 1950-51) the salaries of engineers with zero or one year of experience declined
relative to those with 9, 10, or 11 years of experience. In the post-Korean period,
1953-54 and 1954-55, the wages of the engineers with zero and one year of experi-
ence declined relative to those with 9 or more years. This decline does not appear
in 1953-54, but it is marked in 1954-55 and also in the two-year period 1953-55.
80 Between 1929 and 1932, the median salary of engineers with less than one
year's experience declined relatively more than that of all engineers; salaries for
those with one year's experience fell 26.5 per cent as compared to 18.7 per cent
for all engineers. For the decade 1929-39, the median for beginning engineers de-
clined 14.1 per cent; for all engineers the decline was 4.2 per cent.
From 1932 to 1934 the median salary of new engineers declined less than for
all engineers (Blank and Stigler, The Demand and Supply, Table A-8, p. 130).
This accompanied a marked decline in the ratio of the interquartile difference to
the median from .43 to .35 for engineers with less than 1 year of experience, while
the corresponding ratio for those with 9-11 years of experience was virtually un-
changed (.45 in 1932 and .44 in 1934) and increased from .72 to .75 for those
with 30-34 years of experience (Blank and Stigler, Table A-3, p. 117). I would
suggest that this reflects the upward pressure upon very low wages that stemmed
from the National Industrial Recovery Act and related phenomena; this interpre-
tation is supported by the fact that, between 1932 and 1934, the lowest quartile
of salaries for engineers with less than 1 year of experience rose from $89 to $91
per month, while the median fell from $111 to $110 and the highest quartile fell
from $137 to $129. For experienced engineers, all quartiles fell from 1932 to 1934.
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porary "shortages"), to contract, However, the available data are in-
consistent with this surmise; during World War II, at least, the "margin
for experience" contracted in each of the five specialties for which
data are available,8'
Therefore, for the present we shall assume that the behavior of the
experience differential is not entirely due to a statistical mirage and,
in part, reflects other factors. One of these may be that the relative
demand for inexperienced (as against experienced) engineers increases
when total demand for engineers increases, and vice versa.
One possible explanation of why it is more profitable, given the
initial difference in salaries, to train and promote inexperienced engi-
neers to senior positions than to recruit experienced engineers in a
tight labor market, but that it is more profitable to do the reverse in
other kinds of markets, is as follows.
In a normal labor market, the individual firm can hire both experi-
enced and inexperienced engineers in the quantities it desires from the
unemployed resulting from normal labor turnover. But in a tight labor
market, experienced engineers cannot be hired from the ranks of the
unemployed, but must be bid away from their current employers.
(The reverse is true of newly graduated and, by definition, inexperi-
enced engineers.) There are two reasons why this is more costly than
hiring comparable engineers who are currently unemployed: (1) it is
time-consuming to find an appropriately skilled and experienced engi-
neer who is currently employed and "pirate" him and (2) it is costly
to induce him to leave a situation where he has known and favorable
prospects for advancement, good personal relations, etc. and, where
done, it is usually at a substantial increase over his current salary. Both
81Blankand Stigler, The Demand and Supply, p. 136.
Despite these facts, there may be a connection between the sharp rise in demand
for certain specialties, and the contraction in the experience differential. Consider:
the sharp rise in the entrance rates for certain types of engineers may have led
to a switch to those specialties by students—which could occur within two years—
thereby decreasing the relative supply of graduates in other fields and (ceteri$
paribus) causing a rise in their entrance rate. Whether such a shift took place
during (say) the Korean episode is not easy to determine: the data on percentage
of engineering degrees awarded in various fields reveal a suspicious tendency for the
percentage in "other" to rise from 1950 to 1953. (Cf. Blank and Stigler, Tables
C-5, C-fl, C-7, and C-8, pp. 160-165. "Other" is other than civil, mechanical,
electrical, chemical and mining; specifically it includes aeronautical and electronic
engineers.) However, it is obvious that a more detailed analysis is necessary to
see if the data will bear this interpretation; but even if they do, it is far from
clear that this "mirage argument" provides a complete explanation of the behavior
of the experience differential.
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of these factors make the marginal cost of hiring additional experienced
engineers rise substantially when the labor market tightens, but do not
affect the wage rate that must be paid to those experienced engineers
already hired, provided no new ones are added. And they do not apply
to new engineering graduates. Hence, the marginal cost of recruiting
experienced engineers rises relative to that of hiring inexperienced ones,
even though their relative wage rates remain unchanged.82 This tends
to reduce the demand for additional experienced engineers (relative to
that for inexperienced) at given relative wage rates, thereby (given the
supply functions) driving up the relative wages of the inexperienced.33
Conversely, when the market for engineers loosens, it becomes
easier for an employer who needs an experienced engineer to find
one currently looking for a job so that the marginal cost of hiring him
is no greater than the wage paid those already employed. Thus, when
the over-all demand for engineers falls, the marginal cost of hiring an
experienced one falls relatively (to that of hiring an inexperienced
one), if relative wage rates are unchanged; therefore there is a tendency
for the relative demand for and wages of the inexperienced to decline.
This explanation applies directly to the case of engineers. Super-
ficially, at least, it also seems consistent with the behavior of teachers'
salaries. And we believe it is applicable to a wide variety of labor
market situations. Indeed, whenever a firm has an incentive to prefer
previously hired workers to new ones—either because of a desire to
minimize the costs of labor turnover or because it has made an invest-
ment in training its workers—it will try to keep its present employees
from desiring to leave. Since it does not have a parallel incentive for
the newly hired, it may follow the market for that group, but maintain
a given wage rate for each job among the more experienced.4 This
32 That is, in a tight labor market, the supply curve of experienced engineers
to a firm develops a discontinuity at the quantity currently hired. However, this
discontinuity disappears—or is greatly reduced—in a "normal" or "loose" market;
this is a species of monopsonistic behavior.
83 One would expect that the (few) experienced engineers who do get onto the
labor market when it is tight would receive higher wages than those who do not.
Perhaps they do, but two contrary possibilities must be considered: (1) that the
experienced engineers appearing on the market may be an inferior sample of the
relevant population and (2) that, because of the market situation, employers have
made such short-run arrangements that they cannot effectively use additional ex-
perienced men. Furthermore, it is notoriously difficult to discriminate in favor of
newcomers without creating grave discontent among old employees. The need to
extend the "recruitment price" to those already hired may be a serious deterrent
to recruiting experienced personnel; this is typical of monopsony.
84 To do this a firm need not juggle its starting rate continuously. It will suffice
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will generate a pattern of fluctuations in experience differentials in
response to labor demand similar to that which students have observed.
Given the association between skill and experience, which is implied
by the practice of promotion from within, the skill differential is likely
to move with the experience differential.
Interindustry Differentials
LONG RUN35
Mostdiscussions of interindustry wage differentials proceed without
much explicit consideration of economic theory. The literature abounds
in ad hoc hypotheses, some of which are consistent with neoclassical
price theory but many of which are not. However, these various
hypotheses are usually treated as being equally plausible, a priori;
consistency with the implications of price theory has counted for very
little in appraising the merits of a theory. Our attitude is somewhat
different; we believe that if a theory is inconsistent with the implica-
tions of price theory it is cause for concern, and that an explanation
is in order. Consequently it will be helpful if we begin our discussion
by spelling out what is implied by price theory for interindustrial
differentials.
In the long run, under competitive conditions,36 any industry will
pay the same price for a given grade of labor as any other industry
hiring in the same location. This remark must be qualffied for differ-
ences in the nonpecuniary attractions of different industries and
locations, but let us abstract from these at first. Therefore, in the long
run, real wage differentials among industries will reflect differences
in the skill mix. Money wage differences among locations, for given
skill, should be no greater than can be rationalized by differences
in living costs.
simply to have two or more similar entering job titles with different rates, and hire
for the job title consistent with the current market rate.
In this section, the distinction between long and short run is drawn very
sharply. The theoretical basis of the distinction is the usual Marshallian one. In
practice, we interpret a period as long, for the purpose in hand, if shifting the
initial or terminal date to any other year in the same reference cycle would not
alter the argument. Specificially, we regard 1899-1953 or 1909-53 or even 1929-53
as "long periods," but not 1929-38.
In the Methodological Appendix, the argument of this section concerning the
relation of long run and short run, the "competitive hypothesis," and related
matters is stated in more detail.
86 We shall assume, except when the contrary is specifically stated, that competi-
tive conditions exist.
276THEORT AND MEASUREMENT
This means that there should be no association of industry wage
levels either with the amount of labor employed or with the amount of
capital employed (total or per worker) except insofar as either of
these quantities is correlated with the skill mix. This absence of associa-
tion between industry wage level and quantity of labor utilized is
an important distinguishing characteristic between long- and short-run
situations (see Appendix). In the short run, the greater the increase
in employment over the recent past, the more likely is an industry
to encounter rising wages because of short-run inelasticities of labor
supply; hence the theory implies a positive association of increase in
labor quantity used and wage increase in short periods, but not in long
periods. Moreover, it seems reasonable to suppose that it will be more
likely that skilled labor will become relatively scarce37 to an expanding
industry than nonskilled. Therefore, in the short run, skill differentials
should be positively associated with changes in employment.38
That is, we interpret price theory as saying that in the long run
each industry's wage level will, ceteris paribus, vary in the same direc-
tion as its skill and locational mix (see below) and, in particular, will
not be related to changes in the quantities of labor or capital employed.
Now if ceteris were exactly pan bus, and our sample were large enough,
thecorrelationcoefficient(among industries)between long-run
changes in wage levels and those in (any) factor quantity would be
exactly zero. But our samples are limited and ceteris is never exactly
paribus; hence the theory will be considered "not inconsistent with
the evidence" if the above mentioned correlation coefficients are ap-
proximately zero. Inconsistency with the evidence will emerge if
ceteris is insufficiently paribus in the sense that forces affecting long-run
relative wage changes are significantly correlated with long-run relative
changes in factor quantities.39
That is, it will take longer to train workers with skills peculiar to the industry
than unspecialized workers and hence, for a time, their elasticity of supply will be
less.
38 This is analogous to Clark Kerr's contention that, "The lesser the degree and
the greater the rate of industrialization, the wider will be the occupational dif-
ferentials and the greater the premiums for skill." (See "Wage Relationships—The
Comparative Impact of Market and Power Forces," in The Theory of Wage Deter-
mination [cited in footnote 1], p. 187, especially no. 2.)
° Now a word about the nonpecuniary attraction of different industries. It is
hard to believe—though imaginable—that industries as such have differing degrees
of nonpecuniary attractiveness to labor force members. Most of the apparent non-
pecuniary differences among industries would seem to boil down to differences in
the relative attractiveness of different locations and of the specific jobs offered. For
example, we submit that a job as bookkeeper in the New York office of a coal
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Now, how do these inferences square with available evidence?
One body of evidence is presented by Fabricant4° in a study of average
growth rates of real hourly wages, labor employed, and capital utilized
in 33 industries from 1899 to 1953. Let us suppose that in a period
of 54 years the long-run forces that affect the relative levels of in-
dustries' wages make changes sufficiently large to permit us to treat
differences between 1899 and 1953 as reflecting mainly these forces
and, only to a minor degree, random and short-run forces.42 That is,
the differences between 1899 and 1953 are assumed to be explicable
on the hypothesis that they are, save for random disturbances,
positions of comparative statics. If so, there should be no associa-
tion between either the relative growth in the quantity of labor utilized,
or the relative growth in the stock of capital employed in a given
industry, and the relative growth in wages (measured by average
hourly earnings) in that industry. The rank correlation coefficients be-
tween (a) wages and labor employed and (b) wages and tangible
capital owned,48 with each industry taken as a single observation, are
+.21 between wages and labor quantity and +.29 between wages
and capital quantity. The standard error of the rank correlation co-
efficient with 33 observations is .17, and hence neither coefficient is
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level."
mining firm is no less attractive than a similar job in the same location in an
electronics firm. However, coal mining will offer proportionately more jobs in
mining towns, and underground, than (say) electronics manufacturing and there-
fore might well face a higher pecuniary supply price for its labor.
It would not be correct, conceptually, to identify unskilled jobs with unattrac-
tive ones, but historically there has been a strong positive association. In general,
as industries have shifted away from unskilled labor they have also improved
working conditions and reduced nonpecuniary disutilities. And since it is obviously
very difficult to measure or indicate the relative nonpecuniary attractiveness of
different industries, we have assumed that the rank of the various industries with
respect to nonpecuniary utilities varies with the percentage of its workers employed
in unskilled jobs. Clearly, this is a rough approximation which must later be
improved upon.
4° S. Fabricant, Basic Facts on Productivity Change, New York, NBER, Occa-
sional Paper 63, 1959, especially pp. 29-37.
41 These data are presented in extended form in J. W. Kendrick, Productivity
Trends in the United States, Princeton for NBER, 1961.
42 See Methodological Appendix.
Perforce, we use the Kendrick-Fabricant definitions of labor, capital, and
output. The data used are contained in Table B, pp. 46-47, of Fabricant, Basic
Facts. "Wages," "labor," and "capital" mean here percentage change in each of
these variables between 1899 and 1953.
It might be contended that, because we have two coefficients differing from
zero, and with the same sign, the two coefficients together differ significantly from
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These findings are compatible with the competitive bypothesis.4
Indeed, the fact that both of the correlation coefficients are positive,
as well as small, is what might be expected because of the tendency
for rapidly growing industries to locate (as of 1953) in relatively
high-wage urban centers. There is, moreover, further evidence that is
also favorable to the competitive hypothesis.
(1) Contrary to much of the recent literature, there was only a
slight correlation between productivity° and average hourly labor
compensation among 33 industry groups during the period 1899-1953.
The rank correlation during that period was +.24 (insignificant at the
5percent level); in various shorter periods the coefficient was ap-
preciably higher.47 Confirming this is the fact that during 1899-1947,
among 80 manufacturing industries, the rank correlation coefficient
between output per man-hour and average hourly labor compensation
was 0.26—not quite significant at 5 per cent; during individual decades
of that period, the coefficient was invariably higher than this.48
It would be possible to hide behind the insignificance of the above
coefficients and say that the competitive hypothesis is not disconfirmed.
However, it seems more plausible to suppose that the two coefficients
(noted above) together indicate the operation of some rather weak
force systematically correlating average hourly labor compensation
and productivity. One explanation of this that would not be incom-
zero (to which theory implies they are both equal). However, output, capital, and
labor are all highly correlated so that we cannot suppose the two coefficients to be
independent, and combining the tests is therefore extremely difficult.
By "competitive hypothesis," I mean the hypothesis that prices and quantities
behave as though they were in long-run equilibrium under conditions of pure
competition. When we speak of the short-run competitive hypothesis we mean
the same hypothesis except for the modifications introduced by the substitution
of Marshallian short-run equilibrium for long run (see Appendix).
46"Productivity"is total productivity as defined by Kendrick; i.e., output per
unit of input of both labor and capital. However, output per unit of labor input
is highly correlated with total productivity (rank correlation coefficient among 33
industry groups is +0.94) and, as Kendrick says, "Thus analysis of productivity
change based on output-per-manhour measures should give results comparable
to analyses based on total factor productivity" (p. 155). Therefore, we shall con-
sider Kendrick's results, where "totai productivity" is interchangeable with man-
hour productivity.
The competitive hypothesis implies that there will be no correlation in the long
runbetween(average) productivity and wages. That is, industries in which average
productivity grows relatively to others will show an increasing ratio of average to
marginal (labor) productivity because all industries must pay the same for given
grades of labor in the long run. This, of course, is not true in the short run.
Kendrick, Productivity Trends, Table 55, p. 198,
48Ibid.
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patible with the competitive hypothesis is that there is a tendency for
industries with a greater than average increase in productivity to ex-
perience a greater than average "improvement" in skill mix49 and,
therefore, to have a greater than average increase in hourly labor
compensation. Though not directly testable, this explanation seems
to have considerable plausibility. Another possibility consistent with
the competitive hypothesis is that increases in productivity are weakly
associated with a tendency toward urbanization and higher wages.
Last, but not least, in the short run a positive correlation between
relative wages and employment is to be expected (see below). This
coefficient may approach zero in the long run, but it may remain
positive and finite for a very long time—long enough to generate
(at least) some of the positive coefficients reported in this section.5°
Obviously, failing empirical tests of these and rival hypotheses, there
is room for doubt and debate.
(2)Another finding consistent with the competitive hypothesis is
that the ratio of capital compensation per unit of capital service is
only slightly correlated with changes in average hourly labor com-
pensation among 33 industries in the period 1.929-53; the rank correla-
tion coefficient was only +.12.' The competitive hypothesis implies
that this coefficient be zero. Though the coefficient is insignificant
at the 5 per cent level, we are inclined to take its positive sign seriously
and rationalize it as follows: in industries with a higher than average
rate of increase in productivity, there is a slight tendency for both
labor and capital "quality" to increase more than the average.62 A
further finding that tends to support this conclusion is the very slight
positive correlation (+.05) between (1) factor compensation (of
both labor and capital) per unit of input, and (2) productivity among
33 industries in 1899-1953.
That is, a greater than average increase in the percentage of high-earning
and presumably skilled workers employed. "Skill mix" is defined more precisely
below.
° This possibility is discussed in more detail in the appendix. The point was
raised in discussion by both M. J. Bailey and H. C. Lewis.
51 Kendrick, Productivity Trends, Table 55.
52 By "capital quality," I refer to the intangible (and unmeasured) inputs
that add to the nonlabor income of an enterprise, but are not included in its
measured capital stock. Included in these would be entrepreneurial skill and
investment in research and development. In this connection, Kendrick reports
(Ch. VI, p. 183) a rank correlation coefficient of +.68 between research and
development expenditures, as a per cent of sales in 1953, and the average annual
rate of change in total factor productivity in 1948-53.
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Contrasted with these slight positive correlations is the very sub-
stantial negative rank correlation coefficient, during 1899-1953, between
unit prices of output and factor productivity, —.55, which is signfficant
at 5 per cent.53 The sign of this coefficient is what the competitive
hypothesis would lead one to expect. Combined with the other findings
cited it bears out the view that, as between industries, the relative
gains of factor productivity are passed on to buyers and none accrue
to the factors employed.
(3) Still a third finding that bears upon the competitive hypothesis
is the behavior of the interindustrial wage structure itself. We have
seen that there has been a secular decline in skill differentials in the
economy as a whole. What has been said of skill differentials also
applies to geographical differentials.
We also know that the ranking of industries with respect to their
level of earnings per worker is quite stable over long periods of time.
That is, the rank correlation of an industry's position in the industrial
wage hierarchy in one year (or period) with another very distant in
time is "quite high." For example, Cullen found a rank correlation
coefficient of +.66 for 76 manufacturing industries between ranks of
per-worker annual earnings in 1899 and 1950. In Kendrick's data, the
rank correlation between average hourly earnings in 1899-1909 and
1948-53 was Slichter found a coefficient of rank correlation
of +.7289 between the average hourly earnings of male unskilled
labor among 20 manufacturing industries in 1923 and 1946.56
Because of the secular decline in skill margins and in regional differ-
entials, the competitive hypothesis implies that there would have been
a secular decrease in interindustry relative wage dispersion if the skills
and geographical mix had remained more or less unchanged.57 The
evidence that there has been a secular decrease in interindustry rela-
tive wage dispersion is far from conclusive; and Cullen's scepticism
of this evidence as proof of secularly58 reduced dispersion seems fully
Kendrick, Productivity Trends, Table 57.
54 D. E. Cullen, "The Inter-industry Wage Structure, 1899-1950," American
Economic Review, June 1956, PP. 353-69, especially Table II, p. 359.
Kendrick, Productivity Trends, computed from Table 54.
56 S. H. Slichter, "Notes on the Structure of Wages," Review of Economics and
Statistics, Feb. 1950, pp. 80-91, especially p. 88 and Table 7.
Kerr ("Wage Relationships," PP. 189-191) argues this very strongly, though
without indicating the crucial role of the competitive hypothesis.
58 The very marked and undisputed declines since the late 1930's are irrelevant
for long-run analysis, as it seems clear that at that time these differentials were
abnormally large.
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warranted."0 It is possible that further investigation will show that
dispersion has indeed been reduced. But if it does not, certain more
or less alternative inferences may be drawn: (1) despite the general
decline in skill margins, the relative wage premiums that must be paid
by industries that are expanding their labor forces rapidly were as
great in the late 1940's as at the turn of the century;"° (2) there was
an increasing dispersion in the "richness" of industrial skill mixes61
which offset the reduced skill margins; (3) there were offsetting inter-
industry changes in skill mixes, locational mixes, etc.; and (4) the
competitive hypothesis is wrong. These inferences are not mutually
" Cullen, "The Inter-industry Wage Structure," p. 361. Further evidence to the
same general effect is provided by correlating the percentage wage change between
1899 and 1953 (from Kendrick's data) with the index of "richness of skill mix" by
industry, in 1950 (see n. 63). If the relative richness of skill mix of the various
industries had been unchanged over time, the percentage wage increase should have
been the smaller, the richer the skill mix, because of the secular decline in skill
margins. However, the rank correlation coefficient was only —.086(between rich-
ness of skill mix in 1950 and percentage change in wages between 1899 and 1953).
The sign is in accord with the hypothesis of no change in relative skill mix, but
far too small to be taken seriously.
60 That is, the industries that are "very high" wage payers in any given year
include a disproportionate number of those expanding rapidly, and therefore trying
to increase their total labor force; the converse applies to those industries that
are "very low" wage payers. Industries at either end of the rankings include a
disproportionate fraction of those in temporary disequilibrium. Naturally, those
industries need not be the same ones in 1899 and 1950.
61 By "richness of the skill mix," I refer to the relative numbers of skilled, semi-
skilled, and unskilled workers employed. An industry's skill mix isricher, the
greater the fraction of the first, and the smaller the fraction of the last in the
work force.
We can measure the richness of the skill mix of different industries in 1950 from
the statistics of Occupation by Industry which, so far as we are aware, has not
been published for any other Census. The measure of the richness of an industry's
skill mix is defined as the following weighted average:
aJ4WJ
jz1 Jr.1 R= (males)+ (females)
E4 E
This weighted average refers to the i th industry; W is the median annual earnings
of persons in the foccupationthroughout the economy; ais the number of persons
of given sex employed in the I th industry, and the i th occupation; and Eis the
number of persons employed in the i th industry. R4 is a weighted average of the
nation-wide median occupational earnings of the employees in the i th industry
with the fraction of the i th industry employment in the various age-sex classes
serving as weights.
Sex, as well as occupation, is treated as a determinant of skill mix because
women, even in the same occupational category and industry, tend to be paid
less than men (for whatever reason). It would have been better to have corrected
our weights for degree of unemployment, but we were unable to do so. The rich-
ness of skill mix in 1950 was rank correlated with median industrial annual earn-
ings in 1949 by a coefficient of +.613.
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exclusive, and they could all be true to a degree; however, none of
the first three has yet been tested, though it is far from impossible
to do so.
We have already presented some evidence which tends to reject
(4); i.e., which tends to support the competitive hypothesis. And there
is some further evidence to the same effect: both Cullen and Woytinsky
find evidence of diminishing secular dispersion of interindustrial earn-
ing among the particular industries that happened to be at the upper
and lower extremes of the distribution in a particular year.°2 This means
that, although the over-all interindustry dispersion among a collection
of industries may not have diminished appreciably over time, the
spread among the group of industries that happened to be paying very
high and very low wages in a given base year (e.g., 1899 or 1929)
diminished. In other words, the particular industries that are toward
the high and low extremes in the interindustrial earnings hierarchy in
a given year tended to regress toward the mean with the passage of
time.
This is what the competitive hypothesis implies will happen; for, in
any given year, part of the interindustry dispersion of wages is due to
disequilibrium of industries expanding and contracting employment
more than the average, and this source of interindustry wage dispersion
is reduced over time by the operation of the price system. The com-
petitive hypothesis implies nothing concerning the long-term trend
in interindustrial wage dispersion among a particular group of indus-
tries as a whole, except that it should depend solely upon variations
in skill and locational differentials and random disturbances.
One further hypothesis, not strictly of a long-run variety, should
be mentioned. The rise of an economy from a less- to a more-full
utilization of its labor force (including its reserves) may cause a re-
duction in interindustry differentials, as happened when the economy
emerged from the depression of the 1930's to the full employment of
62Cullen("Inter-industry Wage," Table III, p. 361) found a reduction between
1899 and 1947-50 of 8-12 per cent in the difference between the median annual
earnings in industries in the upper and lower quartiles of the distribution of 84
manufacturing industries, in 1899. W. S. Woytinsky (Employment and Wages in
the United States, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, Chap. 39, pp. 460-
462 and 507-509) found a tendency for low-wage industries in 1929 to have
climbed relatively to high-wage industries by 1950.
Cullen (pp. 864-365) notes that most of the narrowing in dispersion in his data
occurred before 1921. This, of course, would suggest that the short-run disturbances
had been washed out before that date. This interpretation of Cullen's findings is
different from (and possibly inconsistent with) his own.
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the l940's. Such behavior would follow from the narrowing of skill
differentials during such periods. Whether this limited experience can
be generalized to a proposition relating level of employment, or growth
rate in labor demand, to the interindustry dispersion of wage rates is
not clear. However, it is a possibility.
Several other hypotheses concerning the long-run equilibrium in-
dustrial structure of wage rates have been advanced by Slichter:64
(1) "The average hourly earnings of male unskilled labor (U) tend
to be high where the average hourly earnings of male semiskilled and
skilled labor (S) are high." Slichter found, in 1939, a rank correlation
coefficient of +.7098 (among 20 manufacturing industries) between
U and S. If this correlation is interpreted as resulting from a tendency
for industries using relatively expensive types of skilled labor also
to use expensive types of nonskilled, then it is compatible with the
competitive hypothesis. Slichter accepts this interpretation in part,66
but also contends that the correlation is partly due to company wage
policy, which presumably is independent of market forces; on this
point, see below. It should be noted that it is also possible that Slichter's
observation reflects short-period and not long-period forces; i.e., ex-
panding industries are more likely than others to encounter increasing
supply prices (as a function of rate of increase of employment) for
all kinds of labor.66
(2) "The hourly earnings of male common labor (M) have some
(not pronounced) tendency to be low where the percentage of women
(W) among wage earners is high." The coefficient of rank correlation
between M and W in 1939 (for 19 manufacturing industries) was
+.4491, and in 1929, +5224.67 This, as Slichter (in effect) argues,
may well reflect the operation of the competitive mechanism; i.e.,
63 This has been stressed in two studies of English data: P. Haddy and N. A.
Tolles, "British and American Changes in Inter-industry Wage Structure under
Full Employment," Review of Economics andStatistics,Nov. 1957, PP. 408-414;
and P. Haddy and M. E. Currell, British Inter-Industrial Earnings Differentials,
1924-1955," Economic Journal, Mar. 1958, pp. 104-111. This tendency also appears
in Cullen's data ("Inter-industry Wage") for World War II; however, it does not
appear during World War I.
64 Slichter, "Notes on the Structure of Wages." Slichter does not distinguish
carefully between long- and short-run relations; consequently, the interpretation
placed on his findings is entirely our own.
65 Ibid., p. 84.
66 This possibility would seem less likely in 1989, to which Slichter's data refer,
than in the 1920's, 1940's, or 1950's. It is also possible that the correlation reflects
the common effect of locational factors.
67 Industries are ranked in inverse order of male common labor earnings.
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women are hired mainly in low-wage industries and men, in order
to compete with them, must accept less than the average male wage.
That is, the correlation is presumed to reflect competition for similar
jobs, and not osmosis. If this explanation is correct, then the industries
where women are most highly concentrated should be those in which
the unfavored (by the market) males, e.g., Negroes, are also con-
centrated; and this seems to be the case.°8
(3) Slichter also found substantial rank correlation between net
income after taxes, as a percentage of sales, r, and average hourly earn-
ings both of unskilled and of skilled and semiskilled workers.69 Slichter
interpreted r as an index of profitability. Accepting this interpretation,
we could easily rationalize the observed rank correlations as short-
period phenomena resulting from the short-run association between
increased labor demand and profitability. However, Slichter, like many
other writers, contends that this phenomenon "reinforces the view
that wages, within a considerable range, reflect managerial discretion,
and that where managements are barely breaking even, they tend to
keep wages down."° This interpretation is incompatible with the com-
petitive hypothesis.
We believe that the importance of this possibility can easily be
exaggerated. Nonetheless, the field work on our study of interfirm wage
differentials has confirmed the oft-expressed view that large and
profitable firms will often ignore local labor market situations by over-
paying on certain jobs in certain areas in order to avoid undesired
intercompany differentials. Such firms also manifest a desire to be
toward the top of any labor market in which they hire, both for reasons
of prestige and quality selection.
To be sure, there is a tendency for out-of-line wages to be corrected
"as soon as the opportunity presents itself," but it is also true that large
firms are more dilatory about correcting overpayment (e.g., red circle
rates) than correcting underpayment. This, together with a preference
for selective recruitment policies, creates an upward bias in wage level
relative to the market as of any given moment. Thus, we would be
inclined to agree that large and profitable firms do tend to pay more
68Therank correlation coefficient between percentage of women and percentage
of Negroes (among males) employed (from 1950 Census data) for 14 industries
was +.386; when finance and agriculture are excluded, the coefficient is raised
to +662. However, the osmosis hypothesis requires further investigation.
69Slichter,"Notes on the Structure of Wages," p. 88. °Ibid.,see also p. 90.
285WAGE DIFFERENTIALS:
at any one time than could be explained by the competitive hypothesis.
However, this cannot explain movements in relative wages; at most,
it can explain relative wage levels as of a given moment.
These remarks pertain directly to individual firms, and not to entire
industries. Their relation to the industrial wage structure results from
the fact that in some industries the percentage of workers employed
in large firms is greater than in others. Industries concentrating rela-
tively large fractions of their labor forces in large firms should tend to
exhibit relatively high concentration ratios;7' hence there might well
be an association between high concentration ratios and high wages
at a given moment of time.
However, this is no reason to suppose there would be an association
between changes in relative industrial wage levels over time and the
index of concentration as of a given moment, as some writers have
argued.?2 These writers contend that the index of concentration is a
rough (inverse) indicator of the relative degree of competitiveness
of an industry;73 and that noncompetitive industries tend to raise wages
more than others. But, since it is not alleged that the indexes of con-
centration for different industries have changed during the relevant
time period, it cannot be permanent differences in industry structure
that are responsible for differential wage behavior; it must be differ-
ential changes in industry behavior. That is, what must be explained
are differential changes in the willingness or ability or both of highly
concentrated industries (relative to others) to grant wage increases;
to our knowledge this has never been attempted. It should also be
noted that to relate levels of concentration with increases (in favor
of concentrated industries) in wages implies a secular increase in wage
dispersion which is grossly inconsistent with known facts.
Because the hypothesis that interindustrial differences in degree of
monopoly are an important factor in explaining the interindustrial
differences in wage behavior has had wide currency, and is obviously
a rival to the competitive hypothesis, we have attempted one rather
simple test of it. We have taken Nutter's data on the relative extent
7' As measured by (say) the percentage of the industry's employment concen-
trated in the four or eight largest firms.
72 For example, H. M. Levinson, "Post-war Movement in Prices and Wages
in Manufacturing Industries," Study Paper No. 4, Joint Economic Committee,
Congress of the United States, 1960, pp. 2-5 and 21; also J. W. Garbarino, "A
Theory of Inter-industry Wage Structure," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
1950, pp. 282-305, especially pp. 299-300.
This is highly debatable but, for the sake of argument, let us concede it.
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of monopoly in 1899 and 1937 by major industry groups,74 and corre-
lated the change in the rankings between those dates with the change
in the rankings of wages paid by those groups.75 The correlation co-
eficient of these rank changes was —.05, indicating a slight (negli-
gible) tendency for a decrease in monopoly to accompany an increase
in wages—inconsistent with the hypothesis.76
(4) Slichter alleges a strong inverse association between hourly
earnings of unskilled labor and the ratio of payrolls to sales. He explains
this by saying: "Managements naturally are more concerned about the
rates which they pay for labor when payrolls are large in relation to
the receipts of the enterprise than when payrolls are small." One
(slightly astonishing) implication of this is that vertical disintegration,
per se, leads to high wages. But leaving this aside, let us concede that,
in the absence of competition, a iow ratio does make it easier for a
benevolent employer or an aggressive union to raise wages than other-
wise. However, before accepting this as an important determinant of
industrial wage differences, we would urge consideration of the follow-
ing alternative: high ratios of payrolls to sales are more likely to be
found in industries that specialize in fabricating operations, and are
associated with low wages because the likeithood of such specializa-
tion is greater where the fabrication can be performed by low-wage
labor.
But at the very most, the above relation obtains only at a given instant.
It provides no warrant for a long-run interpretation of Dunlop's con-
tention that "wage and salary rates would be expected to increase
most ...wherelabor costs are a small percentage of total costs."78
G. W. Nutter, The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in theUnitedStates, 1899-
1989, University of Chicago Press, 1951, Tables 10 and 11.
" The wage figures were obtained as follows: 1953 (annual average) hourly
wages were extrapolated back to 1899 by means of Kendrick's data, and ranks
were obtained; these were compared with the ranks of median annual earnings
per worker in 1939 as reported in the 1940 Census (see H. P. Miller, "Changes
in the Industrial Wage Distribution of Wages in the United States, 1939-1949,"
An Appraisal of the 1950 Census income Data, Studies in Income and Wealth,
Vol. 23, Princeton for NBER, 1958, Table B-2. It is assumed that the 1937 and
1939 rankings would be virtually the same.
76 David Schwartzman ("Monopoly and Wages," Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science, Aug. 1960, pp. 428-38) reaches a similar conclusion on the
basis of comparing United States and Canadian industries with varying concen-
tration ratios.
Slichter, "Notes on the Structure of Wages," p. 87.
78J. T. Dunlop, "Productivity and the Wage Structure," Income, Employment
and Public Policy, Essays In Honor of A. H. Hansen," New York, Norton, 1948,
p. 360. In fairness to Dunlop, it should be noted that he has not indicated whether
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So far as we are aware this contention has never been substantiated
for the long run.
(5) One determinant of an industry's place in the interindustry
wage hierarchy at a given moment is the relative richness of its skill
mix. For 1950, we ranked industries by richness of skill mix and corre-
lated this with rank in the interindustry wage hierarchy; the rank
correlation coefficient was +.612.° This cross-sectional relationship
reflects departures from long-run equilibrium, crudeness of industrial
classifications, etc. Nonetheless it indicates a substantial degree of
relation between the two sets of rankings.
SHORT RUN
Let us begin our discussion of the short-run behavior of the inter-
industry wage structure by considering the relation of its variations
to those in employment. The competitive hypothesis explains such
variations as due to wages rising in industries where employment is
expanding because of short-run inelasticities of labor supply, and
falling in industries where employment is shrinking because of labor
immobility. In the short run, differential changes in skill mix are as-
sumed to be uncorrelated with differential changes in employment.80
There has been a number of studies of the relation of variations
in the interindustry wage structure to changes in employment. Un-
fortunately, not all of their findings are mutually consistent. For ex-
ample, Garbarino81 found a rank correlation coefficient of +.48 be-
tween percentage changes in hourly earnings and employment (for
34 manufacturing industries) in 1923-40; Ross and Coidner found
that in three of four periods studied there was a strong positive associa-
tion of percentage increases in hourly earnings and percentage in-
creases in employment.82 Ostry found that in Canada there had been
he intended this relationship as long or short run. The short-run version is discussed
below.
This coefficient was computed from an analysis of 14 major industry groups.
80SeeAppendix.
81Carbarino,"Theory of Inter-industry Wage Structure," p. 304.
82A.M. Ross and W. Goldner, "Forces Affecting the Inter-industry Wage
Structure," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1950, pp. 254-281, especially
Table VI, and pp. 272-276. The four periods studied were 1933-38, 1988-42,
1942-46, and 1933-46; the deviant period was the wartime interval 1942-46. The
authors present no correlations but merely place industries into four quartiles in
accordance with the percentage increase in employment.
F. C. Pierson (Community Wage Patterns,Universityof California Press, 1953,
Chap. VI) also finds a positive rank correlation between average hourly earnings
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an appreciable correlation between percentage changes in hourly
earnings and in employment; among 36 industries, the correlation co-
efficient in 1945-49 was +.44; in 1949-56 it was +.53, and for 1945-56,
+.56.83
Moreover, Hansen and Rehn, in a study of wage differentials from
1947 to 1954 among eight industries in Sweden,84 found substantial
interindustry correlation between wage drift85 and excess demand86
for labor, which is consistent with the hypothesis that short-run wage
differentials result mainly from differing rates of increase in labor
demand. They found virtually no correlation of wage drift with gains
in average man-hour productivity, but were unable to use Swedish
profit data for interindustry analyses.
But the data do not all point to one conclusion: Slichter found
among 20 industries, during 1923-39, a coefficient of rank correlation
(between percentage changes in hourly earnings and percentage
changes in employment) of only +.2812.87 Eisemann found that in
1939-47, percentage increases in manufacturing wages were negatively
correlated with percentage increases in employment; however, the
absolute increase in average hourly earnings was positively correlated
with percentage increases in employment.88 Levinson89 has found that
in 4 of the 11 year-to-year changes between 1947 and 1958 there was
and employment for manufacturing industries among several cities between 1929
and 1939, but not during the war period, 1940-48.
83 S. W. Ostry,"Inter-industryEarnings Differentials in Canada, 1945-1956,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Apr. 1959, pp. 335-352, especially pp. 341-
343.
84 B. Hansen and Costa Rehn, "On Wage-Drift: A Problem of Money-Wage
Dynamics," Twenty-jive Economic Essays in Honour of Erik Lindahl, Stockholm,
1956, pp. 87-133, especially pp. 105-106 and 128-133.
85 That is, wage increase in excess of what was implied in collective bargaining
agreements.
86 That is, unfilled vacancies minus unemployment.
87 Slichter ("Notes on the Structure of Wages," p. 90) argues very explicitly
that the relation between hourly earnings and profits is due to wage policy and
not labor-market pressure. He found a small negative coefficient of rank correlation
between changes in employment and changes in average hourly earnings in 1923-39
for unskilled workers (as contrasted to the positive coefficient for all workers).
Somehow, this argument is not very impressive. (1) As argued above, one would
expect the supply of unskilled workers to a given industry to be more elastic in
the short run than that of semiskilled and skilled. (2) Slichter's period is almost
identical with that of Carbarino ("Theory of Inter-industry Wage Structure"),
who found evidence of a stronger relationship than Slichter, and with better data.
88 Doris M. Eisemann, "Inter-Industry Wage Changes, 1939-1947," Review of
Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1956, p. 446.
89 Levinson, "Post-war Movements," Table 1, p. 3.
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a negative correlation among 19 manufacturing industries between
percentage changes in straight-time hourly earnings and percentage
changes in production worker employment. He also found a negative
partial correlation coefficient between this pair of variables for 1947-53
and a negligible positive one (+.0046) for 1953-58.°
Bowen9' computed correlationcoefficientsbetween percentage
changes in average hourly earnings, w,andpercentage changes in
employment, e,duringsix subperiods of the interval 1947-59. These
various coefficients reflect the association between wandeamong20
two-digit manufacturing industries. Bowen computed both simple and
partial correlation coefficients. The partial coefficients between wande
heldconstant some or all of the following: (1) average level of profits
in the industry; (2) the concentration ratio (in 1954); and (3) the
percentage of the production workers unionized (in 1958). All pos-
sible first and second order partial correlation coefficients between
wande(holdingconstant the other variables, both singly and in
pairs) are presented. The coefficients show a positive correlation be-
tween wandeinthe three subperiods when unemployment was rela-
tively low,°9 and this relation is generally stronger in the partial than
in the simple coefficients. In the three subperiods in which unemploy-
ment was relatively high, the coefficients showed a different pattern:
in two of these three subperiods the simple coefficients were negative;
in one of them all of the partials were negative; and in another, half
of them were negative.
Thus Bowen's findings (on this point) tend to support the com-
petitive hypothesis for periods of "low unemployment," but not for
those of higher unemployment. That the relation between wande
shouldbe stronger in periods of low unemployment is in the spirit of
the competitive hypothesis (though not its letter); i.e., in periods
of low unemployment, short-run elasticities of labor supply to indus-
°Ibid.,Table 2, p. 4. A. H. Conrad ("The Share of Wages and Salaries in
Manufacturing Incomes, 1947-1956," Study Paper No. 9, Joint Economic Committee
of Congress, Washington, 1959) obtained similar results on CensusofManufactures
data for all 61 three-digit industries, for the period 1949-56.
91W.G. Bowen, The Wage-Price Issuer A Theoretical Analysis, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1960, pp. 59-66 and Table E-1, pp. 134-135.
92Thesubperiods of low unemployment are characterized by an unemployment
percentage (of the civilian labor force) that was "generally below 4.3." The sub-
periods of high unemployment are those where the unemployment percentage was
always above 4.3. Bowen, pp. 24-29.
The letter of the competitive hypothesis makes no provision for unemployment
as a variable in supply or demand functions.
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tries are likely to be smaller, and dhhlerential increases in employment
therefore more likely to produce differential wage changes. But if
Bowen's findings are accepted, then the competitive hypothesis is un-
informative, if not invalid, as an explanation of short-run wage move-
ments in the presence of "appreciable"°4 unemployment.
In short, the evidence does not give unqualified support to the view
that short-run variations in labor demand are a major cause of variation
in straight-time hourly earnings. Some of the contrary evidence can be
"explained away." The adverse findings of Ross and Goidner for 1942-46
and of Eisemann for 1939-47 may well be due to the fact that the war
industries which expanded most rapidly were the very ones where
dilution of the skill mix was greatest. However, it is harder to explain
away the findings of Levinson, Conrad, and especially Bowen. Let us
now turn to alternative explanations.
PROFITS, CONCENTEATION, AND RELATED VARIABLES
Levinson suggests that relative industry wage levels have varied either
with (industry levels of) current profits or with profits lagged one
year.95 He measures profits as return on stockholders' equity both
before or after taxes. This alleged relation is not, of itself, inconsistent
with the competitive hypothesis, for the level of current profits would
be expected to be associated with recent increases in employment.
However, Levinson computes partial correlation coefficients between
percentage wage changes, w,andpercentage increases in employment,
e(averageprofit level, F, constant), for 1947-53 and 1953-58 and also
between wandP (econstant)for the same interval. In 1947-53, the
coefficient between wandewasnegative, while that between wandP
was positive; in 1953-58, the latter coefficient substantially exceeded
the former though both were positive.96
These findings were similar to those of Bowen, who finds a consistent
positive correlation (among 20 manufacturing industries) between per-
centage change in average hourly earnings and percentage change
in average level of profits. This positive relation is found in the
Using Bowen's 4.3 per cent as a criterion for distinguishing years of appreciable
unemployment from others, 38 of the first 58 years of this century were years of
"appreciable unemployment." Even if we exclude the 11 years, 1930-40, 22 out of
47 years showed appreciable unemployment. (These figures are Stanley Lebergott's
as quoted by Boweri in Appendix A, pp. 99-101.)
Levinson, "Post-war Movement," pp. 2-7. °Levinson,"Post-war Movement," Table 2, p. 4.
Bowen, Wage-Price Issue, pp. 67-69 and 184-135.
291WAGE DIFFERENTIALS:
simple correlation coefficients in all of Bowen's subperiods; it is also
found among the partial coefficients (save for three small negative
ones).
What are we to make of these findings? Barring some unperceived
differential change in hiring requirements (among industries), we
would seem driven to accept Slichter's judgment that "wages, within
a considerable range, reflect managerial discretion, that where manage-
ments can easily pay high wages they tend to do so, and that where
managements are barely breaking even, they tend to keep wages
down."8 This judgment is, of course, incompatible with the competi-
tive hypothesis for the short run.
It is important to distinguish sharply between levels and movements.
It is entirely in keeping with the competitive hypothesis that more
profitable firms should find it advantageous to demand superior per-
sonnel, and pay more to get it. This isessentially what Slichter,
Reynolds, and others have contended. What is more difficult to accept
is the finding that differences in profit levels also explain movements
in interindustry differentials.
For certain periods, the level of current profits may well be related
to the change in wage rates. One such period seems to have been
1947-58, and perhaps there have been others. But unless we are to infer
a secular trend toward increasing wage dispersion in favor of the
high-profit industries—a trend which no one has alleged and which
would be inconsistent with the available evidence—we are left with
the problem of explaining why the profit-wage relation is so inter-
mittent. To say that the relation may well hold for one period but not
for another is merely to state the facts. The problem of theory is to
indicate the differential characteristics of the periods when it does
hold and those when it does not. Let us consider a possible explanation.
Despite the evidence he presents on the association of wage change
and profit level, Bowen distrusts differentials in profit levels as an
explanatory factor of differential in wage changes among industries.9
He does so mainly because he feels that the partial correlations in the
1954 and 1958 recessions were very small, and that the dominant factor
in the simple correlation was the high intercorrelation among wage
changes, concentration ratios, and degree of unionization.
Because of the behavior of the partial correlation coefficients Bowen
98Slichter,"Notes on the Structure of Wages," p. 88.
°°Bowen,Wage-Price Issue, p. 68.
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(rightly) rejects the possibility of a consistent ceteris paribus relation
between wage changes and either concentration or unionization, taken
separately. However, he contends that when we consider the combined
effect of concentration and unionization (which are strongly inter-
correlated in his sample), we find a stable relationship.10° In discussing
this, Bowen abandons correlation analysis and instead divides his
industries into two groups: a "market power" sector (consisting of
industries that are both highly concentrated and highly unionized)
and a "competitive" sector in which the industries have the reverse
characteristics. He argues that, with one exception,101 the percentage
change in average hourly earnings was greater in the market-power
sector in all of the subperiods between 1947 and 1959. Although recog-
nizing that the average level of profits was generally higher in the
market-power sector, he says "that the importance of profits in this
picture ought not to be exaggerated."°2 He also rejects the possibility
that different rates of growth in employment are a differentiating char-
acteristic of the two sectors.'°3
Bowen does not allege that what he has observed is part of a secular
trend, but neither does he attempt to indicate what special character-
istics of the period, 1947-59, are responsible for the unusual behavior
observed, or why such behavior cannot persist indefinitely.° However,
one possible explanation seems to be fairly obvious: the market-power
sector contains a relatively large number of finns that respond to
market stimuli rather slowly as compared with firms in the competitive
sector. This relative sluggishness reflects the fact that investment de-
cisions are expensive; can be made only infrequently and cannot easily
be reversed. This would seem to be most characteristic of those sectors
of the economy where "productive capacity" per unit of output is
relatively expensive and long lived. Firms with these characteristics
typically produce durable goods and are disproportionately found in
100 Ibid., pp. 74-81.
101 The period January 1949-October 1950.
102 Bowen, Wage-Price Issue, p. 78.
103 Whatever the validity of this contention, it is not consistent with his own
data. From Table 13, p. 77, we can compute (putting initial employment in
Jan. 1947 =100)that employment in June 1959 was 102.5 in the market-power
sector but only 97.7 in the competitive sector.
104 Bowen does offer an explanation, in spirit similar to what follows, of wage
behavior in the 1954 and 1958 recessions (pp. 82-84). However, he does not
recognize that if there is growth in differentials in recessions, there must be either
(1) contraction of the differentials in periods of high employment or (2) a secular
trend (in the differentials).
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Bowen's market-power sector. Investment and output decisions in these
firms respond not so much to current profits, as in the competitive
sector, but to (moving) averages of current and past sales and profits
which serve (along with other indicators) as a guide to the future.
On this view, the wage behavior described by Bowen is explained
thus: at the end of World War II both sectors were confronted with
situations of strong demand and high profits. The competitive sector
acted to eliminate its excess demand faster than the market-power
sector where long gestation periods of capital goods combined with a
cautious outlook to hold back the investment program. This made the
market-power sector's period of high profits, full capacity operation,
and "strength" in product prices last longer than the competitive
sector's period did. This, in turn, facilitated the payment of relative
increases in earnings (in the market-power sector) during most of the
1950's.
If this explanation is correct, the growth of excess capacity and price
weakness in the market-power sector during the late 1950's will soon
end its relative wage gains, if it has not already done so. Also, if true,
there should have been similar periods to the 1950's in the past—e.g.,
in the 1920's, as an aftermath of World War I. This particular hypothesis
implies the same response pattern of wage changes to current profits
or to current labor market conditions in Bowen's two sectors; it re-
quires (1) that the two sectors both start from initial positions of
excess product demand; (2) that the response mechanism of the market-
power sector to excess product demand be slower, so that it takes a
longer period to reach equilibrium; and (3) that relative wages in
the competitive sector be high enough to obviate the need for short-run
adjustments under pressute of a growing relative labor scarcity. It is
quite possible that the wage adjustment mechanism in the market-
power sector is also more sluggish; the differential incidence of long-term
contracts with automatic deferred wage increases would suggest this.
We also suspect that, in the above explanation, the role of product
prices is crucial. That is, when firms believe that cost increases can be
passed on to buyers, they are more inclined to grant wage increases
than when the reverse is the case. This is consistent with some findings
of Dunlop on the relation of changes in wages and product prices,'05
105 J. T. Dunlop, Wage Determination under Trade Unions, 2nd ed. New York,
Keley, 1950, Chap. VII. Dunlop found a strong positive association (among in-
dustries) between declines in wage rates and product prices during the recessions
of 1929-32 and 1937-38, and presents substantial evidence to support this observa-
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which should be investigated further and brought up to date, espe-
cially the interrelation among changes in wages, product prices, and
profits.
But if there is anything to the idea that there are two important
sectors of the economy in which the ratio of current wages to the
current marginal productivity of labor'° behaves differently,itis
incompatible with the competitive hypothesis as an explanation of
wage behavior in the short run. This is because shifts in the ratio of
current wages to current marginal productivity of labor can always
be expressed as changes in the elasticities of (imagined) supply of
factor or demand for product curves or both, whose alleged shifts are
the staple of noncompetitive explanations of relative wage and price
behavior. Such short-run shifts are simply the obverse side of a pattern
of delayed response to market stimuli; it may also be true that a pat-
tern of delayed response—especially in adding to productive capacity—
requires some restriction upon entry and a substantial degree of con-
centration. Failure of either of these conditions to obtain may make
it impossible for any one firm to hold off on expansion because of its
inability to keep communicating with—or even to keep track of—all
its potential rivals. The reader will understand that this is to suggest
an hypothesis; testing it is another and far more difficult matter.
There are a number of other ad hoc short-period hypotheses con-
cerning the behavior of industry wage levels. For example, it has
been suggested that changes in industry wage levels tend to be more
closely related in absolute than in percentage terms. While more
careful writers have usually agreed that neither percentage nor absolute
measures of changing differentials was ideal, the argument is that,
because of union or governmental pressure, or both, industries tend
to obtain equal absolute wage increases rather than equal percentage
hikes.107 This argument has been widely discussed in recent years, and
appears to have had considerable validity for the period 1933-45, when
tion for the two depressions in question. However, Levinson ("Post-war Move-
merit," p. 15) found that from 1947 through 1951-52 "price changes were un-
related to changes in gross hourly earnings—after that point, however, the correla-
tion became very much stronger."
106Thatis the value of the marginal physical product as reflected in the output
records for the same accounting period to which the wages are imputed. The
reason for this rather narrow view of the competitive hypothesis is indicated in
the Appendix.
10?Avery large number of writers have argued in this fashion. One of the earliest
was A. M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, University of California Press, 1948,
Chap. VI.
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interindustry (like other) differentials were narrowing. However, for
the period since 1947, the hypothesis does not seem so plausible.b08
It is worth noting that this hypothesis implies, contrary to the com-
petitive hypothesis, that ir the short run relative wage levels are
altered by variations in supply determinants (union and government
policies) rather than by variations in demand determinants.
To argue that movements in relative wage levels are strongly corre-
lated with levels of relative profits or changes in relative product prices
is not to contradict the competitive hypothesis, per Se. For both of the
aforementioned independent variables may be correlated with varia-
tions in the level of employment and reflect only the influence of this
variable on relative wage levels. Moreover, industries with high current
profits might well be industries in process of an unusually marked
tendency to be hiring workers to operate new processes or to work in
newly developing high-wage areas, or both. Either or both of these
tendencies could create (upward) labor market pressure on wage
rates despite a tendency for over-all employment to decline. None of
the studies to which reference has been made has attempted to
control against these possibilities.
PRODUCTIVITY
Some wrfters have found that the increase in average hourly earnings
was greater in industries where the increase in physical production
per man-hour was greater; e.g., Dun1op'° and Garbarino.11° Barring
a correlation of skill mix and/or location with productivity, such a
relationship is incompatible with the competitive hypothesis in the
long run; whether it is compatible in the short run depends upon
whether increases in man-hour productivity are positively correlated
with increases in employment via correlation with the value of labor's
marginal physical product.
The alleged factual relation between man-hour productivity and
wages has itself been disputed by Levinson," Meyers and Bowlby,112
and Perlman.h18 These authors, especially the last, rightly stress the
108Forexample, Levinson's data would not seem consistent with it.
Dunlop, "Productivity and the Wage Structure."
110Garbarino,"Theory of Inter-industry Wage Structure," pp. 298-300.
111"Post-warMovement," Table 1, p. 3.
112F.Meyers and R. L. Bowiby, "The Inter-industry Wage Structure and
Productivity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Oct. 1953, pp. 93-102.
113R.Penman, "Value Productivity and the Inter-industry Wage Structure,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Oct. 1956, pp. 26-39.
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importance of product price movements in determining the relative
average value productivity of labor in different industries. Despite the
dispute about whether the various correlation coefficients are signifi-
cant, and which periods should be studied, it seems that the coefficients
are usually positive,114 which suggests the existence of a positive short-
run association, but one which is disturbed by extraneous factors whose
intensity varies from one period to another.
How one is to interpret this association is another matter. Garbarino
found that in Dunlop's data (where the correlation between increases
in man-hour productivity and wages was strong), the coefficient of
rank correlation between increases in employment and in man-hour
productivity was only +.08.h15 Obviously this militates against the
short-run competitive hypothesis that there is a positive association
between changes in hourly earnings and changes in man-hour pro-
ductivity, because of an empirical association of the latter with rising
output and employment. Another possible explanation, of pertinence
in the long run as well as the short, is that industries in which man-
hour productivity increases most are those in which the skill mix is
likely to improve most. Yet another possible explanation of this
phenomenon posits the existence of a link between wage increases
and rises in productivity via profits and ability to pay, a la Slichter,
Levinson, et a!. But there is no good reason, either in theory or fact,
for accepting any of these hypotheses.h16
UNIONS
Our discussion of interindustry wage differentials has obviously left
out unions; the omission is intentional. The main reason for exclusion is
the failure of previous research to obtain very satisfactory results in
relating them either to the levels or movements in interindustry wage
differentials. The well-known conclusion of Douglas and of Ross and
114Butnot always: Meyers and Bowiby turned up some negative coefficients
("Inter-industry Wage Structure," p. 98) and so did Levinson.
115"Theoryof Inter-industry Wage Structure," p. 285.
116Ina recent paper, L. Johansen ("A Note on the Theory of Inter-industrial
Wage Differentials," Review of Economic Studies, Feb. 1958, pp. 109-113) con-
cludes that "we may expect not changes in wage differentials, but wage differentials
themselves to be correlated with the changes in productivity." This result, however,
refers only to differentials that reflect labor market disequilibrium; i.e., his results
depend on labor market disequilibrium embodied in his equation (4) on p. 110.
For the short run, his conclusion is identical in empirical content with the con-
ventional Marshallian one, where productivity is reflected in a parameter of the
industry labor demand fraction.
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Coldner" that new unionism is associated with differential percentage
wage gains to an industry, but long-established unionism is not, was
about as far as anyone had been able to go before the work reported
on by H. C. Lewis in this volume. We shall not attempt to appraise
this work here but only note its relevance to our discussion.
One possibility of detecting the influence of unionism is to analyze
the association among industries between wage changes and profit
levels, holding employment changes constant. If unionism is effective in
making wages higher than they would have been in its absence, this
should be reflected in a forced sharing of profitshlS which should be,
in the short run, over and above the influence of labor market condi-
tions. That is, the positive partial association between wage changes
and profit levels should increase with the strength of unionism—
however measured. Of course, the influence of extraneous factors such
as changes in skill and locational mix must be somehow taken into
account.
Conclusion
This paper's point of departure is that relative wage levels, both by
skill and industry, behave more or less as though they were market
prices reflecting predominantly the interplay of changing tastes, tech-
niques, and resources—the competitive hypothesis. The implications
of this hypothesis, however, are not so simple as they might seem
because tastes, techniques, and resources interact in peculiar and
complicated ways. Moreover, the basic hypothesis has required amend-
ment to allow for the effect of changes in minimum wage laws, etc.,
for secular rural-urban migration, and for the gradual broadening of
educational opportunities.
The competitive hypothesis is at its best, both in explaining skill
margins and interindustry differentials, when it is used to explain
variations over long periods of time. It can hardly be said to be firmly
established as an explanation of wage phenomena even for long periods;
liT P. H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, p. 564; Ross and Goidner,
"Forces Affecting," p. 287.
118 To test our hypothesis, it is necessary that unions be not "too strong"; i.e.,
unions must compel relatively more profitable firms to share their "excess profits"
with wage earners (but not obliterate them), so that there are still greater than
average profits to be observed. It is conceivable—though not likely—that unions
could be so effective in raising wages that all potential supernormal profits were
transferred to wages, completely obscuring the hypothesized relation.
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but it has at least survived (reasonably well) the tests to which it
has so far been put.
For the short run the competitive hypothesis does not appear very
reliable. There are a number of findings concerning interindustry dif-
ferentials which simply are not consistent with its short-run implication
that relative industry wage rates vary in the same direction as relative
changes in employment, in any given short-time interval (see Appen-
dix). We are not without alternative short-run hypotheses; but these
either break down during one time interval or another, or still are in
a primitive state of formulation and testing.
In this paper we have discussed only skill and industrial differentials.
No attempt has been made to analyze interfirm, interplant, and inter-
regional differentials which, incidentally, may be associated with skill
or industry differentials. However, this task will be attempted in the
near future.
Appendix on Methodology
This brief appendix was written because of numerous criticisms and
misunderstandings of my remarks on the "competitive hypothesis," its
implications and their tests. This statement is not intended as original,
in any fundamental sense; and obviously it is cursory. The views ex-
pressed, or similar ones, have been in• the atmosphere for some time.
Though the spirit of the exposition is similar to that of Milton Fried-
man's famous essay on the methodology of positive economics,159 its
content is different. In short, all of the blame for possible misstatement
must rest here; much of whatever credit is due should go elsewhere.
When we speak of the "competitive hypothesis" we are referring
to a hypothesis which states that the behavior of relative prices and
quantities can be explained as though these prices and quantities were
equilibrium values in a static economic model,120 in which all pur-
NOTE: I am very grateful to my colleagues K. J. Arrow and Marc Nerlove for
their criticism of an initial draft.
Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, Chap. I, University of Chicago
Press, 1952.
120Thisis not the entire content of static general equilibrium theory, but it is
the part with which we are concerned. In particular, we are abstracting from those
aspects connected with the determination of money prices.
In private discussion, objections have sometimes been made that the competitive
hypothesis is not—or ought not to be—defined so as to apply only to cases where
concurrent (unlagged) relations obtain among the variables. There can, of course,
be no quarrel with a definition, but if the competitive hypothesis is defined so as
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chases and sales are made by units bent on maximizing satisfaction'2'
subject to individual budgetary restraints, having access to the same
technology, and treating prices as parametric constants, independent
of the quantities they (individually) purchase or sell. The prices in
question, when taken as a set, make all excess demands equal to zero.
As this argument is very well known, it is not considered necessary
to spell out its details. The competitive hypothesis discussed here
could be called, with propriety, the long-run static competitive hy-
pothesis.'22 (The short-run version is mentioned briefly below.)
The utility functions of the households in our model shift with the
tastes of the individuals who compose them; i.e., changes in a house-
hold's tastes are reflected in shifts of one or more parameters of its
utility function, Similarly changes in the technology available to a firm
are reflected in shifts of one or more parameters of its transformation
function. Consequently, we may write the excess demand function for
the /thkind of labor by the i th industry as
—D (pi—pn;Vi —Vim;a.1—ajz;/i — f3,i,;i1 =
Forsimplicity, we assume each of these industries to produce only one
commodity; hence we have n prices and the subscript of the ps's runs
from 1 to n.'23 v, is the wage rate of the /thkind of labor in the i th
industry, and /= 1,2 -- m.Because our argument will be concerned
not with the v5j's, but with their ratios, let us define Wq =
wherevt is the wage paid the /thkind of labor in the t th industry.
This means that in long-run equilibrium, w1 =1;i.e., all industries
to permit lagging relations then, in the short run, there are no generally applicable
theorems concerning concurrent price-quantity relations. The character of the con-
current relations will vary both with the structure of the lagged system and the
time period. Because we prefer that the competitive hypothesis have some specific
short run implications, we define it as applying solely to static relationships.
Kenneth Arrow has said he believes widely applicable theorems on price-quantity
relations involving lags can be deduced from individual behavior functions which
include weighted lags. That is, with only "reasonable" restrictions on the weights,
theorems can be deduced which will apply almost as widely as do those of compara-
tive statics in the long run. When these results are published it will be possible
to push further the argument of this appendix; but they will not invalidate what is
stated.
121 Profit maximization is clearly a special case of this.
122 This statement applies either to an economy in stationary equilibrium or to
one always on its growth path. Some of the relative prices will vary from a sta-
tionary state to a situation of balanced growth, but not those discussed in this
appendix.
123 Capital goods are treated as outputs of particular industries and their prices
are included in the p's.
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must pay the same wage rate for a given kind of labor. —aare
parameters reflecting changes in the tastes of the households; /i —f3
are other parameters reflecting changes in the technologies of the firms
and y—ir reflectthe resources owned by each decision-making unit.
(For simplicity, when there is no danger of confusion we shall refer
to the set, a —ajz, bya —withoutsubscript; similarly, for the sets
—f3and yii—
Barringcorner solutions,static equilibrium requires that qij
0 (i =1,2 —n;/= 1,2 —m).It also requires that v =
andWq= 1,where r is any industry other than i. Obviously, these are
not sufficient conditions for equilibrium; however, they are necessary,
and they are the only ones with which we shall work. Let us designate
the value of w1 at which=Wrj (i=1,2 —n)as w5° —theequi-
librium value of w1. (As we have seen, w2°w1° =1,where fisa
kind of labor other than j.However,to avoid confusion, we shall not
utilize this fact and write the equilibrium value of w5 as w,*.) Let us
also designate qjj*0 as the value ofcorresponding to wj and
F( qij) as the equilibrium quantity of /employedin the i th
industry. (Q1isthe observed employment of the fthkind of labor in
the i th industry, and Q,,°isits equilibrium va1ue.') Neither w1°
nor Q,"isobservable; they are intellectual constructions whose raison
d'être is to explain the behavior of the observed Wj and Qj.Thecom-
petitive hypothesis, in effect, states that the behavior of W1andQis
"approximately" the same as that implied by static economic theory
concerning the behavior of w, and Q°.
wjand Q,varyboth from time to time and place to place. (For
the sake of exposition, let us speak only of variation from one date
to another, remembering that date and place are, in this discussion,
interchangeable.) At any given date,
log wj =logwj° + log (2)
124Toavoid formal indeterminacy let us suppose that workers are not iridiffer-
eat about the industry in which they work, at given relative wages, and that in
equilibrium the industry of each worker is determined. However, to preserve the
equilibrium condition, v5 =v,,,let us assume that workers' nonpecuniary prefer-
ences for industries are such that, at equal wages, the number preferring to work
in a particular industry is proportional to the demand of that industry.
This assumption is, of course, restrictive and unrealistic. But to relax it would
greatly complicate the exposition and obscure the point of the appendix. Moreover,
to do so would not generate any interesting new possibilities;it would merely
embody in the model the nonpecuniary preferences from which compensating wage
differentials arise.
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whereisa "disturbance" term whose log is assumed to be uncorre-
lated with log w5° and which reflects all the forces bearing upon log
wj1 except those affecting log w,*; i.e., Wj =Wj*•
Weassume that E(logcj) = 1 and that o-= Aw,, where
ogE
A< 1; i.e., the standard deviation of the disturbance term is propor-
tional to the equilibrium value. (Hereafter, for brevity, we shall write
for log Wj, j for log q,etc.for all logarithms; we shall also assume
all variables to be measured as deviations from their mean values.)
The assumption embodied in (2)is, of course, arbitrary. Its only
defence is that it is similar to those usually made in econometric re-
search, and that some arbitrary assumption of this kind must be made
to begin any argument relating theory and observation.
The movement of ii3j between any two dates (0) and (1) is repre-
sented by £j; i.e.,ij — ii3(0). Similarly,we define
= andwill adopt analogous conventions for all
other variables. This gives us, by substitution in (2)
wj = iii + (2a)
We also have
= tQjj° + i (3)
whereis a disturbance term. The analogue of each relation among
i5, w51* andthat has been posited, is assumed to hold among Q,,,
Q* andZj,and
E(i5zq) = E[(iZ5* + j) (Qtj° + j)] =
E(i* *) + E(AY° q)+E(Q° 2tj)+
(4)
Sincei5' is the same in all industries it is a constant which implies,
because we are measuring all variables as deviations from their means,
that the first two terms in (4) vanish. And, as we interpret the com-
petitive hypothesis, it implies that the second two terms vanish also.
This means that the competitive hypothesis implies that E(ij Qj)
=0; i.e., that it implies an absence of correlation between percentage
changes in wage rate and percentage changes in employment among in-
dustries when the positions compared are those of long-run equilibrium.
Crucial to this contention is the assumption that E( iiQ,° =
E(1 4)=0. To assert E(5* 4) = 0 is to say that the per-
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centage change in the long-run equilibrium volume of employment of
the /thtype labor in the i th industry is uncorrelated with the per-
centage change in the disturbance component in the wage rate paid it.
In a literal sense, there is nothing in economic theory that implies this
statement. But if it were not true, economic theory would be very
different than it is or ever has been. It would have to be so constructed
that transient disturbances to the parameters of the excess demand
functions for factors would have permanent effects (i.e., would change
long-run equilibrium values). This would mean that equilibrium prices
and quantities would reflect not only the states of tastes, techniques,
and resource endowments but also the whole history of prices including
the effects of accidental disturbances. I doubt that one could construct
useful economic models from such premises, and certainly no one
has seriously tried to do so. Consequently, I shall interpret the com-
petitive hypothesis as implying E( iQ = 0.For similar reasons,
we assume E(iQj*j) = 0.
In the short run there is good reason to suppose that E(i5 q)>0.
That is, the short-run disturbances that make measured employment
exceed long-run equilibrium levels (e.g., unanticipated increases in
demand) will also tend to make factor prices exceed long-run equi-
librium levels. As Z andare disturbance terms, and there is no
reason to suppose that disturbances become smaller with the passage
of time, it follows that in the long run, as well as in the short,
E(C5)>0.
For concreteness let us assume that E (i) >0 =constantin
any time period. This assumption is arbitrary, but necessary; to assume
that the expression increased indefinitely with time would open the
possibility that actual prices or quantities, or both, might deviate ever
further from equilibrium ones—i.e., a long run might never be reached.
To assume that the expression diminishes with time would add to the
strength of long-run forces, but such an assumption would be unwar-
ranted and unnecessary. In fact,all we need assume isthat the
expression does not increase so fast as to upset the following argument;
to assume constancy is to impose—for simplicity of statement—a some-
what stronger condition than necessary.
If the competitive hypothesis is true, then E(iZi5 j)willbehave
as E (IiiJ/') whenis so chosen as to generate a long run. As
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we have seen, E( 5° Q°)iszero, but E( ijiQ,)is not because
of E(5 Butthe correlation coefficient between i5jand
will,under competitive conditions, approach zero asymptotically in the
long run. By the usual argument, the closer the approach to zero,
the smaller is the relative importance ofij)inexplaining




The equality of the numerators follows from our argument concern-
ing (4) which showed all its terms to be zero except E(K).The
denominators are equal because =0ex hypothesi, and the ex-
pression under the radical sign is snply the expanded form of the
standard deviation of a sum of two variables which are assumed to
be uncorrelated.
Now in the long run o-2— *increasesindefinitely (see below).
Since it is conceivable that it could shrink despite the
rise in r2tQij*ifthe predominant direction of movement in the Q's
was downward; i.e., if the relative importance of the error component
in observed quantities secularly increased. In the data discussed in this
paper, most of the j1's increased markedly. This does not prove that
the ,°'s (not observable) also increased, but for the sake of the
argument we shall assume that they do. (A complete treatment must
consider other possibilities.) Therefore, given our assumptions, the
denominator of the correlation coefficient grows with time, but the
numerator remains unchanged, so that the quotient eventually ap-
proaches zero.
To reach this conclusion—that the correlation between and ijdiminishes(algebraically) over time to approach zero asymptoti-
cally—in the long run—requires an hypothesis about how the 5's
behave in the long run. The hypothesis is that the 1°'s, predominantly,
have long-run monotonic trends and that their variance increases with
the length of the interval considered. This hypothesis would be satisfied,
for example, if each increasedat a constant percentage rate and
the variance at any given moment was non-zero.
This hypothesis implies that will increase with the passage
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of time and that, provided the covariance of the disturbances is not
"perversely" correlated with time, the correlation between 1ii51 and
jwilleventually approach zero. How much time must elapse before
we have any specffied degree of approximation to a long run depends
upon the divergence in the rates of trend movement among the Q,'s; the
greater the divergence, the less time required. If there is no predominant
tendency toward monotonic trends among the Qj*'s,thenthe long-run
forces may never dominate the behavior of E(ü51ij).
R.H. Strotz has suggested a very useful simile to explain this point: if
a pair of rifle targets is far apart, the difference in the locus of observed
shots may be explained by the difference in aim of the rifieman. But
if they are close together, the error component may make it impossible
to infer at which target a given shot was aimed, and force us to ignore
the difference in targets as an explanatory variable.
Now let us suppose that the correlation coefficient between A and
showsno signs of approaching zero with an increase in the length
of the period, casting doubt on the competitive hypothesis. How should
this eventuality be interpreted? It would not mean that we should
reject price theory as invalid; rather we should say that the assump-
tions of price theory were violated in such a way as to make the com-
petitive hypothesis inapplicable to the data in question. To say this
would not, in any sense, "save" the hypothesis; a hypothesis is valued
according to its fruitfulness, and one that is frequently found to be
inapplicable is inferior to another which is inapplicable less frequently.
If the competitive hypothesis is found inapplicable, there is a variety
of possible alternatives:
1. It is frequently argued that the absence of pure competition
invalidates the competitive hypothesis. Surely it is possible that there
is correlation—in either direction—between iQjandq5becauseof
a correlation of iQjwithchanges in the parameters of (1). The com-
petitive hypothesis asserts that these parameters reflect only tastes,
techniques, and resources;'25 but if the hypothesis is found inapplicable,
one reason might be that the parameters also reflect, inter alia, the
ratio of the value of a factor's marginal product to its rate of reward.
125 Put in a slightly different way, the competitive hypothesis asserts that the
Aw,°'s reflect only changes in parameters reflecting tastes, techniques, and re-
sources, and from no other forces. Among the forces thus excluded are changing
union wage policies which might alter the supply functions of given grades of
labor differently in different industries.
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It should be noted that the competitive hypothesis can be applied
successfully, even though there is monopoly in one or more markets.
It suffices for the argument of this paper that there should be no
changes in the degree of monopoly power;12° i.e., for the present pur-
pose, the competitive hypothesis does not say that observed prices
are approximately those that would obtain under pure competition,'27
but only that changes in these prices are the same as those that would
have occurred if the degree of monopoly power in every market had
been (approximately) constant. That is to say, in terms of equation
(1), there are parameters which reflect changes in the degrees of
monopoly power, but for the period in question they are approximately
constant. Indeed, for the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary that
there should be no changes in the degrees of monopoly power, but
only that these changes should be uncorrelated with (orother
variables whose covariance with iw5 is being studied). On this last
interpretation of the competitive hypothesis, monopoly could be an
important factor in explaining changes in any individual price, but this
would not imply that it would be useful in explaining the relative
long-run changes among any "fairly large" group of prices.
2. The test of the competitive hypothesis we have been discussing
is not a very powerful instrument for discriminating between monopo-
listic and nonmonopolistic situations because—at the level of industry
datal2s_the price-quantity behavior which is characteristic of a chang-
ing degree of monopoly power is often consistent with two or more
very different interpretations. For example, (1)if industries have
quantity responses to price changes that involve interindustrial differ-
ences in the "true lags" of price behind quantity (or vice versa) and
(2) if these lags are subject to change, then the recorded concurrent
association of prices and quantities will be identical with what it would
have been had there been a changing pattern of monopoly behavior.129
To say the same thing in a different way: if one is given a set of
prices and quantities, it is always possible-in the absence of knowledge
about costs or imagined demand elasticities or both—to invent a set
of imagined demand elasticities which vary (if necessary) from one
126 The degree of monopoly power of any seller or buyer is the ratio of price
to marginal revenue or marginal expenditure, as the case may be.
127 This remark applies only to the particular aspect of the competitive hypothe-
sis discussed here. In other contexts—e.g., discussions of relative economic eu-
cieney—the competitive hypothesis implies that observed prices actually approxi-
mate competitive ones.
128distinguished from the data for individual firms.
129 That is, a changing degree of monopoly power, as defined in footnote 126.
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period to the next that will "explain" the price-quantity relations per-
fectly and without reference to any lags.
If firms do not consistently attempt to maximize profits, then varia-
tions in the strength of their "propensity to maximize" also could
simulate the effects of a changing degree of monopoly power. Yet
another possibility arises where there are technological lags of output
behind inputs; variations of these lags (either because of changes in
technology or in interest rates) will simulate the effect of a changing
degree of monopoly power on concurrent price-quantity data.
All of these possibilities are known to have materialized in varying
(and disputed) degrees. To disentangle their separate effects in the
event the competitive hypothesis is rejected is often very difficult and,
in this appendix, we shall make no attempt to discuss the problems that
arise.
At this point, it would be well to emphasize that in this discussion
of the competitive hypothesis we are considering only those aspects
that are relevant to explaining the behavior of a set of industrial wage
rates and employment quantities, or, more generally, industry prices
and quantities. As such, it is a useful test to apply to historical records
of wages, prices, and related quantities of the sort that can be obtained
from censuses and which have recently been extensively utilized by
by Kendrick and others. Its utility lies mainly in the fact that it requires
no data beyond series of prices (factor or product) and quantities—
data that are comparatively easy to obtain. But it is a test that is biased
in favor of accepting the hypothesis.
Consider: we have, in effect, proposed accepting the competitive
hypothesis if the correlation coefficient between th5 and does
not differ significantly from zero. The reason is that, if the coefficient
were zero, E(Qjj*4j) = E(Aj 'Cj) = 0.But (2j ij)reflects
the effect of all forces acting on industry wages and employment ex-
cept those implied in the competitive hypothesis. Suppose that, contrary
to the hypothesis, E( 0, but is small relative to the vari-
ance of E(A1), whose mathematical expectation is zero; in this
event, we might well accept the hypothesis despite its falsehood. To
put the matter in another way: what the hypothesis asserts is also what
the absence of correlation between the disturbance terms implies;
therefore, increases in the variance of the covariance of the disturb-
ances increases the probability of accepting the hypothesis even though
every term in (4) is unchanged.
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Nevertheless, when we have only industry averages for wages
(prices) and quantities at two dates, this test is the only one available.
As the number of dates for which data are available increases, at least
one other test becomes possible. Because E(i, >0, we should
find the correlation between z5jandzQjtendingto be positive, but
(as we have seen) steadily diminishing as the period considered be-
comes longer. This test is not subject to the aforementioned bias.
Further tests are also possible, but they require additional data. Some
of them have been discussed in the text above. However, these tests
usually relate relative industry wage levels, or changes therein, to
the skill-mix or other aspects of the composition of the industries'
labor forces and do not directly involve the methodological issues raised
in this appendix. There are still other implications of the competitive
hypothesis, and other types of tests; it is not suggested that these are
less important than those discussed here.
3. If, on any particular set of data, the competitive hypothesis is
rejected, it is sometimes plausible to suppose that the dates to which
the data refer are insufficiently separated to constitute a long run; i.e.,
the hypothesis may be valid for the long run, but the particular period
studied should not be considered as such. But if such an approach
is not to render the hypothesis inaccessible to empirical confrontation,
it is necessary to specify how long a period must be before it is con-
sidered a long run.
A rough and ready answer to this question is as follows: a time
period is a long run, for the purpose of a particular hypothesis, if
extending it further without limit or reducing it slightly'3° does not
alter the outcome of any relevant test. In the context of this paper,
this criterion means that we have reached a long-run situation when
the series of correlation coefficients between Liiij and tQjgenerated
by extending the length of the period from (0) to (1), by increasing
(1) indefinitely or by reducing it slightly or both, becomes indistin-
guishable from a random sample from a normal universe with a zero
mean.'3'
130 Put differently, a long-run relation is one that holds irrespective of the time
interval chosen, provided the interval is picked from an admissible set of intervals.
Given (0), defining a long-run is akin to choosing the lower bound of the set
of admissible dates for (1) —a set for which there is no upper bound.
181 If the series of coefficients "stabilizes" around a non-zero value, this would
suggest that a long run has been reached and the competitive hypothesis discon-
firmed. However, the possibility of a spurious long run should never be neglected.
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The importance of distinguishing between short- and long-run rela-
tionships arises from the fact that in the short run, ceteris pan bus, there
is likely to be a correlation between w5 and iQj.Thatis, when (0)
and (1) are close together, industries for which is relatively large
will almost certainly be those which are growing relatively rapidly at
(1). And, because of short-run inelasticity of labor supply to individual
industries, the wage rate in the i th industry will tend to rise more,
the greater the increase in employment; this induces positive correlation
between &jand Also,rapidly growing industries tend to experi-
ence (temporary) high profits, bursts of growth in productivity, capital
stock, etc. However, as (0) and (1) become further removed, the
relative size of tQjjbecomesdecreasingly correlated with its relative
growth rate at (1);i.e.,industries that experienced great relative
growth between 1899 and 1953 are not, to any appreciable degree,
those that were experiencing great relative growth in 1953. Moreover,
the correlation between e5 and the growth rate of Q,at(1) tends
to disappear as we lengthen the period over which differential rates
of employment growth are compared; this is because the main reason
for short-run inelasticity of factor supply to an industry is failure to
anticipate demand accurately. And if an industry's employment has
been growing at a more or less steady rate for a fairly prolonged period,
both sides of the market will have time to adjust, thereby eliminating
the correlation; i.e., E( tendsto zero.
In short, lengthening the period between (0) and (1) tends to
reduce the correlation between &, and LiQuntilfor some length—
and all longer ones—it becomes approximately zero. How long such a
period may be, or if it is finite, can be determined only empirically,
and ad hoc. As we have seen, the length of the period will depend
upon the variance among the trends inQ*ascompared with the
intercorrelations of andAj. The appearance of a set of (small)
positive correlations132 may well provoke a suspicion that we have
been studying a period shorter than that necessary to apply long-run
theory. However, it must be remembered that there is no guarantee
that lengthening the period, even indefinitely, will eliminate the corre-
lation; i.e., the competitive hypothesis may be inapplicable even in the
long run.
132 Generated by varying the length of the period (O)—( 1).
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The reader will note that in discussing the competitive hypothesis,
long-run version, we have hardly mentioned ceteris paribus. This is
deliberate; as we interpret it, the competitive hypothesis does not
assert that certain relations hold, ceteris paribus; this is what economic
theory asserts. The competitive hypothesis says that other things are
sufficiently equal for the implications of competitive price theory to
apply. If these implications do not hold, then there is need for an
alternative hypothesis—possibly including the competitive hypothesis
as a special case.
So far, we have been considering only the long-run version of the
competitive hypothesis. The short-run version of the competitive hy-
pothesis is in a somewhat different position (from the long run).
This is because the short-run version is, as we interpret it, supposed to
apply to any and all periods.133 Therefore, because there is a number
of variables associated (for short periods) with relative increase in an
industry's wages, the relationship implied by the competitive hypothe-
sis134 is not the only one that will be found. Hence, the competitive
hypothesis may be interpreted in (at least) two ways: (1) In the
strong form, it states—parallel to the long-period version—that the
relationship it implies is the only one that will be found consistently.'
The repetitive finding of any other relation is inconsistent with the
theory. (2) In its weak form the competitive hypothesis does not state
that there is a simple positive correlation between and LQjbut
merely that this relationship exists ceteris paribus; i.e., appropriate
partial correlations will have positive signs. Intermediate versions of
the hypothesis—e.g., that the ceteris paribus relation between Lw65
and isstronger than that between zw11 and any other variable—
can also be formu1ated.1°
So far all our remarks in this appendix have referred to one specific
kind of labor employed in a number of different industries and whose
wage (in each industry) was recorded.13 In practice, much of the
133Itshould be emphasized that this is one writer's conception. Other econo-
mists may—and some surely will—define terms differently. 'Thatis, that supply price of a factor to an industry, occupation, etc. is a
nondecreasing function of quantity; and for quantities "large enough" it is a mon-
atomically increasing function.
135Thatis, evidence of any other relationship will be explicable as a result
of random disturbances or sampling fluctuations.
186However,it would seem reasonable to insist that the short-mn competitive
hypothesis be stated so as to imply that the partial correlation coefficients (with
all other relevant variables constant) between and LtQj are positive.
13TAfurther implicit restriction is that all employment occurred in one location
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data with which we deal are industry averages of wages in various
occupations or of individuals working in different places. Conse-
quently, as the text indicates, much of the explanation of changes in
relative industrial wages runs in terms of changes in the composition
of the items affecting these averages. The argument of this appendix
does not apply directly to these averages, but only to their components
and the relationships of substitution and complementarity among them.
Where the competitive hypothesis is found to hold for industrial
averages, it implies either that the relative changes among the com-
ponents are unimportant or that they cancel one another.'
COMMENT
DONALD E. CULLEN, New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University
I should like to direct most of my remarks to Melvin Reder's treatment
of interindustry wage differentials, for I find his defense of the com-
petitive hypothesis less persuasive in that area than in the case of the
or some unvarying set of locations, thus eliminating interlocational variations in
excess demand functions.
138has been argued (privately) by H. G. Lewis that there is a priori reason
to suspect long-run correlation between Lw°andLQ10.AsI interpret the
argument, such correlation might arise in several ways, one being the following.
Suppose some industries require two or more kinds of labor. Also suppose, for
simplicity, that the long-run supply curve of each kind of labor is an increasing
function of its price, and that some or all of the industries are sufficiently important
as users of some (or all) of the kinds of labor they hire for the long-run equilibrium
price of any one kind (which is the same for all industries) to increase with the
amount the industry hires. Then, ceteris paribus, industries growing relatively more
(or declining less) than others will tend to create higher relative prices for the
kinds of labor they use most intensively, and hence in their average wage rates.
The pressure to substitute against the kinds of labor that have become relatively
more expensive mitigates, but does not eliminate, this tendency. Ceteris paribus,
this factor would lead to a positive correlation in the relative average wage of an
industry and its relative employment. Its practical importance will depend on the
size of the industries considered; the smaller the industries, the less the importance.
There are other strong forces relating these two variables, e.g., some industries
utilize relatively large quantities of man-hours of dirty, rough work which tends
to have a negative income elasticity of supply. Consequently, these industries tend
to face secular increases in relative (average) supply price of the labor employed
per unit of output, which tends (ceteris paribus) both to raise relative product
prices and therefore to reduce employment, and to increase average wages; this
introduces a correlation opposite in sign to that discussed above. The net corre-
lation between employment and wages, even in the long run, will obviously
depend upon the relative strength of these and possibly other linkages between the
variables. In the text we assumed, faute de mieux, that this net correlation was
zero. However, this is an assumption that may prove misleading.
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skill margin. Orthodox theory, as he points out, would lead one to
predict that occupational differentials will be narrowed as educational
opportunity is equalized; this narrowing has certainly occurred, and
to a very marked degree, in most Western countries; and since he has
shown that the spasmodic nature of this secular trend can also be ex-
plained in competitive terms, I agree that there is no reason to search
for an alternative theory of occupational differentials. When Reder
turns to a consideration of interindustry differentials, however, he
does not offer such decisive evidence in support of the competitive
hypothesis; in fact, the available data suggest that these differentials
have not narrowed much at all. Much of his analysis therefore turns
upon the question of whether anyone has come up with a better ex-
planation of this wage structure than that offered by the competitive
model, and while he inflicts some mortal wounds upon some of the
alternatives which have been put forth, that in itself is not a positive
confirmation of his model.
We now have a great deal of information on three aspects of inter-
industry wage differentials: (1) the structure of these differentials in
local labor markets over short periods of time; (2) the dispersion of
these differentials on a national level over both the short run and,
within manufacturing, the long run; and (3) the relation of short-run
changes in the national structure to several other factors, such as pro-
ductivity and employment changes, concentration, etc. Reder con-
centrates upon the last two of these aspects and offers several valuable
insights to which I shall return. First, however, I should like to con-
sider the problems posed by interindustry differentials in local markets.
The competitive hypothesis, he points out, predicts that "In the
long run, under competitive conditions, any industry will pay the
same price for a given grade of labor as any other industry hiring
in the same location." But if all labor economists agree on anything
(which is doubtful), it is that a wide diversity of rates for the same
jobs characterizes the average local labor market, and that a uni-
formity of rates is usually a sure sign that the market in question is
not "free" but rather is dominated by either organized labor or or-
ganized management.
It is this apparent failure of local rates to equalize which has long
been seized upon by critics of competitive theory as their prime exhibit.
You will recall that Marshall referred to the "naive" assertions of this
nature by Cliff Leslie and other critics of that day, and that he retorted
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that differences in money rates (for the same job in the same market)
were actually evidence of the effectiveness of competitive forces, since
workers of different efficiency must necessarily receive different money
wages in a competitive market.1 As our discussion yesterday showed,
this argument continues unabated today. On the one hand, the inter-
firm differentials examined by Shultz were not widely dispersed and
appeared to be closely related to quality differences. On the other
hand, it was pointed out that this market more closely approached
the competitive "norm" than most others which have been studied,
and that the narrowness of these largely intraindustry differentials
should not be taken as evidence of a similar narrowness of interindustry
differentials for the same type of labor.
Since no one has been able to measure labor quality differences with
any degree of precision, nearly every set of wage data we use to test
the competitive hypothesis is subject to confficting interpretations on
this crucial score. I would agree, however, with the view that many of
these local wage differentials for the same jobs are so large.—50 to
100 percent—that they cannot be explained away as reflections solely
of quality differentials. If you grant this, then haven't you denied the
validity of the competitive hypothesis? No, says Reder quite properly,
since the hypothesis would predict wage variations arising from dis-
equilibrium situations in the short run. To test this possibility, he then
examines the several studies that have compared wage and employment
changes over the short run but justifiably concludes that the evidence
on this point is as conflicting as the evidence adduced to test alter-
native models stressing concentration, profits, productivity, and union
organizations.
One way of resolving this question might be to apply to the local-
market level the type of analysis, comparing wage changes with several
variables, which to date has largely been employed at the national,
industry-wide level. Unlike the gross industry averages used in most
studies, local wage data are often available for identical jobs, are
obviously not affected by interindustry differences in location, and
afford a good test of whether variations within industries (e.g., be-
tween large and small firms) are not more revealing than those between
industries.
For example, consider the provocative data which Dunlop cites to
1 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., London, Macmillan, 1936,
pp. 548-549.
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illustrate his concept of wage contours: in Boston in July 1953, the
union rate for truck drivers ranged among twenty-two industries from
$1.27 to $2.494.2 Dunlop argues persuasively that this great disparity
in the rates paid for the same job in the same market, particularly
when organized by the same union, cannot be satisfactorily explained
either by orthodox theory or by models which emphasize market
frictions or union power. Similar data can be found in other local
market studies and in various BLS publications, and these data in
some ways pose the issues involved in interindustry wage differentials
more sharply than the national, all-worker industry averages. Un-
fortunately, perhaps for lack of data on the nonwage variables, there
has been little if any attempt made to analyze these local wage data
with the rigorous, quantitative methods employed in most of the inter-
industry wage studies.
Also, in keeping with the make-work-for-authors spirit of this con-
ference, I would suggest that the local market has advantages as the
setting for the long-run test that Reder correctly points out is the most
fitting for his purposes: the determination of whether the differentials
existing between the high- and low-wage industries in a given base
year narrow over the long run. I don't know if any of the Census or
Labor Department occupational and industry data from the turn of
the century could be followed through for a single city, but this
procedure, if at all feasible, would naturally avoid the problems posed
by long-run shifts in skill mix and location.
Difficult as such a test would be, I nevertheless suggest that some-
thing more persuasive is needed as a proof of the long-run validity of
the competitive model than the evidence Reder can now offer. As he
notes, we mildly disagree about the interpretation of my own findings
on this point. In analyzing annual earnings data for workers in 84
manufacturing industries over the 1899-1950 period, I found that the
percentage differential between the industries which were at the top
and the bottom of the structure in 1899 narrowed only from 162 per
cent in 1899 to 149 per cent in 1950. While it is true that this slight
narrowing "tends to support" the competitive model, it is hardly over-
whelming as evidence of the leveling effects of competition over a
fifty-year period, and certainly it is not as convincing as the drop in
the skill margin from 200 per cent to 138 per cent over a comparable
John T. Dunlop, "The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory," in New Con-
cepts in Wage Determination, Taylor and Pierson, eds., New York, McGraw-Hill,
1957, p. 135.
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period—a drop, incidentally, which in itself could have produced a
narrowing of interindustry all-worker differentials (assuming little
change in skill mix) without narrowing the "real" differentials between
wages for comparable jobs.
Of course, all-worker data can greatly overstate interindustry differ-
entials because of the effect of skill mix. One of the few sources of wage
data by industry and occupation over time is the Conference Board
figures for unskilled rates by industry for 1923-46. My impression is
that these data are derived from a sample of highly dubious value,
but for what they are worth they show the percentage differential
between the unskilled rates in the high- and low-wage industries in
1923 to have been 134 per cent in 1923, 133 per cent in 1939, and 121
per cent in 1946. Perhaps better data of this nature over a longer
period would show the substantial narrowing necessary to support
Reder's argument, but the available evidence is weak indeed.
When he turns from this "positive" test to considering the alternatives
offered by others, however, I feel he makes at least two very significant
contributions. The first is his vigorous reminder to fellow economists
that there is, after all, a difference between the short and long run,
a first principle frequently forgotten by some of us in our absorption
with the turbulent labor markets of the 1930's and 1940's. Second, he
points out that some of the studies of one aspect of this wage structure—
short-run wage changes compared with several variables—proceed
quite oblivious to the results of studies of a different aspect, the struc-
ture's dispersion over time. If I read him correctly on this point, he is
the first to warn that many studies have suggested in effect that wages
increase most rapidly over time in those industries that tend to be the
highest-paying at any point in time—which would result in a steadily
expanding structure, although all the evidence is against this. Thus, the
data seem to indicate that, at least in some recent periods, wages in-
creased most rapidly in industries such as iron and steel, petroleum
refining, rubber, and automobiles, which have long been high-wage
industries in an absolute sense, and the laggards are such industries
as cotton textiles and boots and shoes, which are low-wage industries
to begin with.
But might this be simply a short-run phenomenon—that, as Reynolds
Median earnings of the top quarter of the wage structure divided by median
earnings of the bottom quarter. For the NICB data, see Sumner H. Slichter, "Notes
on the Structure of Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics, Feb. 1950, p. 89.
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and Taft suggest,4 most industries pass through a "life cycle" in which
they rank at the top of the structure in their growth years and are
then supplanted by other, newer industries? This possibility has not
been adequately tested, but again the burden of my own findings is
to the effect that the high-wage industries of fifty years ago tenaciously
maintained their position against most corners.
And here we can return to the local market studies. Imperfect as
our evidence now is, most of it is consistent in suggesting that: (1)
substantial interindustry wage differentials exist for the same jobs in
local markets and tend to persist in the short run, and (2) to a lesser
extent, all-worker differentials exist between industries on the national
level and these tend to persist even over the long run. If this is true,
the explanation can lie in a combination of the competitive hypothesis
and the findings of local market studies. That is, local differentials arise
for a variety of reasons—frictions, monopsony, the entry of new in-
dustries, union pressure, management philosophy, etc., and once estab-
lished, these differentials tend to persist, partly for "noneconomic"
reasons (for instance, the practical difficulty of abolishing differentials
accepted as customary) and partly for the "economic" reason that, as
Reynolds and Taft put it, "the wage structure never gets a chance to
approach static equilibrium." If the poor do not get poorer, that is,
the rich certainly get richer; they do not sit by idly until the low-wage
industries catch up with them, and consequently the state of the arts
is not frozen for any substantial length of time.
For example, Reynolds and Taft suggest that the persistence of
regional differentials over time is the result not only of the growth of
labor supply in the South but also of the continuing industrial ex-
pansion in the North and West, which has served to offset the "eroding
effect of labor and capital migration."° Reder suggests that the failure
of agricultural wages to catch up with manufacturing wages is also
the result of a continuing disequilibrium over the long run. Can this
not also be true of many other interindustry differentials? If it is true,
however, it is difficult to isolate statistically the effects of the competi-
tive hypothesis, and it also loses much of its predictive value at this
particular level.
Lloyd C. Reynolds and Cynthia H. Taft, The Evolution of Wage Structure,
Yale University Press, 1956, pp. 356-357.
5Reynoldsand Taft, Evolution, 869.
'Ibid., p. 870.
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To sum up: With respect to interindustry differentials, the competi-
tive hypothesis has not been validated in the short run—nor, as Reder
shows so well, has it been conclusively disproved. However, neither
has it yet been proved or disproved for the long run.
Finally, two footnotes. First, it is to be devoutly hoped that we can
soon incorporate fringe benefits in interindustry wage studies, for I
share the suspicion that these have served to widen this type of differ-
ential during the very period when the structure of rates alone appears
to have narrowed (and, of course, during the period when unions have
greatly increased in strength).
Second, I hope someone will tackle the problem of our overreliance
upon manufacturing data in these studies. Perhaps this is not a serious
problem, since manufacturing industries certainly do vary greatly
among themselves in certain respects. Yet, in view of the decreasing
relative importance of manufacturing, I am uneasy over the studies
in which the wage patterns among the 30 or 40 or 80 manufacturing
industries for which we can get detailed data overpower the wage
movements among a few nonmanufacturing industries. In spite of the
hazards obviously involved, the relation of all-manufacturing wages
to wages in agriculture, construction, mining, and particularly the
service industries deserves more attention than it has received.
217